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I. INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected cases concerning Alaska law. This year’s edition is devoted
to cases decided in 2003. The Year in Review is comprehensive
neither in its breadth (many cases are omitted) nor in its depth
(many issues within individual cases are omitted). Attorneys
should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide;
rather, the summaries are intended to provide a useful starting
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point for additional research. The summaries are grouped by subject matter and presented alphabetically within each grouping.
Abbreviations. Several abbreviations are used throughout the
Year in Review. The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, and Evidence are abbreviated “Civil Rule ___,”
“Criminal Rule ___,” and “Evidence Rule ___,” respectively. The
State Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Youth Services is abbreviated “DFYS.”
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In ACS of Alaska, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,1
the supreme court held that where a competitor challenges an incumbent rural local service provider’s exemption under the Federal
2
Telecommunications Act, the burden of proof must fall on the
3
competitor. The Federal Telecommunications Act exempts rural
local telecommunications providers from being required to allow
competitors to piggyback (or “interconnect”) on their telecommu4
nications networks. However, the exemption does not apply to rural service providers if a competitor receives a bona fide request for
interconnection, and the state regulatory commission determines
5
GCI
that the request is not economically burdensome.
Communications Corp. (“GCI”) requested interconnection with
three subsidiaries of the incumbent service provider, Alaska Com6
munications Systems (“ACS”). The Regulatory Commission of
Alaska (“RCA”) affirmed the termination of ACS’s exemptions
7
under the Telecommunications Act. The court reversed the
RCA’s ruling, holding that the agency had inappropriately placed
8
the burden on the incumbent local exchange carrier, ACS. The
court held that the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Iowa Utilities Board
9
v. FCC, allocating the burden of proof to the competitor, controlled in this case, because federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges to FCC rulings, and the Eighth Circuit’s decision was the only ruling allocating the burden of proof in such

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

81 P.3d 292 (Alaska 2003).
47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2001).
ACS, 81 P.3d at 293.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 301.
219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000).
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cases.10 The court remanded the case for further proceedings that
11
would allocate the burden of proof to GCI.
12
In Brigman v. State, the court of appeals held that the Department of Fish and Game (“DFG”) had authority to define permit hunt areas and that these areas could be defined by internal
13
decision. Brigman was convicted for transporting a brown bear
that was shot and killed in an area outside the designated permit
14
Brigman appealed, arguing that the DFG had no
hunt area.
authority to establish permit hunt areas and, in the alternative, that
the DFG could not establish the permit hunt areas by internal decision since it would violate the Administrative Procedure Act
15
(“APA”). Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals found
that a former regulation granted the DFG the power to establish
16
brown bear permit hunt areas. The court then presumed that the
DFG established the permit hunt areas while this regulation was in
17
effect. Since there were no regulations that abolished the permit
hunt areas, the court concluded that the DFG had the power to es18
tablish them. The court of appeals then found that the establishment of the permit hunt areas did not constitute a “regulation” un19
der the APA and therefore could be made by internal decision.
The court based its decision on Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v.
20
Noah, which stated that identification of districts that do not alter
the rights of parties, do not deprive parties of a fair opportunity for
public participation, and do not establish criteria by which permit
applications should be evaluated do not constitute regulations un21
der the APA. Here, the court of appeals reasoned that the hunting permits were awarded by lottery and that all applicants there22
fore had an equal chance to secure a permit for a specified area.
Thus, the court of appeals found that the DFG had the authority to

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

ACS, 81 P.2d at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
64 P.3d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158, 159.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161-62.
935 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997).
Id. at 825-26.
Brigman, 64 P.3d at 161.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

118

05/18/04 2:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[21:1

establish permit hunt areas by internal decision, and affirmed
23
Brigman’s conviction.
In Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow,24 the supreme court held
that an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) finding
that Crawford & Company had unfairly and frivolously contro25
verted insurance claims was a final appealable order. Upon a determination that an insurer has frivolously or unfairly reported a
workers’ compensation claim, Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(o)
requires the Board to notify the Division of Insurance (“Division”), and for the Division to determine whether the insurer
26
committed an illegal claim settlement practice. Based on a statement of the Division’s practices and policies, the court held that the
Board’s determinations and subsequent Division procedures,
though necessarily linked, did not amount to a review process for
27
re-examining the Board’s factual findings of frivolous conversion.
Furthermore, the court held that the appealability of the Division’s
determinations of unfair claim settlement practices, under Alaska
Statutes section 21.36.125, had no effect on its determination that
the Board’s decisions were final orders which were appealable im28
mediately.
In Enders v. Parker,29 the supreme court held that an estate’s
personal representative was entitled to attorney’s fees if her claim
30
was brought in good faith. Enders unsuccessfully sued Parker
over the admission into probate of Joel Kottke’s 1997 will, which
31
disinherited Enders and transferred all interest to Parker. Enders
then sought payment of attorney’s fees under Alaska Statutes section 13.16.435, and Parker cross-appealed for fees under Civil
32
Rules 79(b) and 82(b). On appeal, the supreme court held that
under Alaska Statutes section 13.16.435 an estate claimant may recover attorney’s fees upon satisfying three rules: (1) the claimant
must be a personal representative or hold a nomination as such; (2)
the suit must have been brought in good faith; and (3) the expenses
33
must be necessary and attorney’s fees reasonable. Good faith ex-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 168.
81 P.3d 982 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 983.
Id. at 982-83.
Id. at 985.
Id.
66 P.3d 11 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 12, 13.
Id.
Id. at 15 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.435 (Michie 2003)).
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ists if the personal representative acted to benefit the named suc34
cessors in the instrument she sought to uphold. The supreme
court denied Parker’s cross-appeal, stating that claims for attorney’s fees under Rules 79(b) and 82(b) do not apply if a specific
statutory scheme for attorney’s fees exists, such as section
35
13.16.435.
In Fuller v. City of Homer,36 the supreme court held that under
certain circumstances, the city cannot raise the deliberative process
37
privilege in order to withhold documents from public view. Fuller
brought suit against the City of Homer after the city refused her
requests to inspect various documents relating to an annexation pe38
tition which was ultimately approved by the city council. The city
claimed that the documents were protected under the deliberative
39
process privilege. The court stated that in order to establish a deliberative process privilege, the government must show that the
disputed document is an internal communication which is both
40
predecisional and deliberative. If the government meets these requirements, the opposing party can then rebut the presumption of
privilege by showing that the public’s interest in disclosure out41
weighs the government’s interest in confidentiality. Here, the
court determined that the public’s interest in disclosure did outweigh any governmental interest in confidentiality, because Fuller
requested to view the documents after the proposed annexation
42
was submitted to and approved by the city council. In addition,
while the city’s interest in confidentiality, significantly waned after
approval by the city council, the public’s interest in disclosure grew
43
significantly stronger. The court concluded that the deliberative
process privilege was not available at the time Fuller’s request was
made; therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case with di44
rections to grant Fuller’s request.
In Garner v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,45
the court of appeals held that the Department of Health and Social

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 17.
Id. (citing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 79(b), 82(b)).
75 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id at 1064.
Id at 1065.
Id.
63 P.3d 264 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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Services had abused its discretion by failing to consider whether
“undue hardship” would result from a refusal of Medicaid coverage
46
for dental services to persons over twenty-one years of age. John
Garner, a mentally retarded thirty-five year old, was denied coverage for dental procedures because he failed to meet the regulatory
requirement of being able to verbally express any “pain and acute
47
infection.” Alaska’s Medicaid regulations contain a provision allowing the Department of Health and Social Services to make ex48
ceptions to the requirement where undue hardship would result.
The court found that Garner had established a prima facie case for
undue hardship and discrimination under the Americans with Dis49
abilities Act. Garner and the State disagreed as to what accommodation was reasonable to remedy such discrimination and undue
50
hardship. The court of appeals remanded the case to the superior
51
court for further investigation.
In Greenpeace, Inc. v. State,52 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Office of Management and Budget is not required to conduct an environmental analysis that utilizes standards under the
National Environmental Policy Act in making a determination of
whether a project is consistent with the Alaska Coastal Manage53
ment Program (“ACMP”). Greenpeace appealed a determination by the Division of Governmental Coordination (“DGC”) (an
arm of the Alaska Office of Management and Budget) that British
Petroleum’s “Northstar” project to develop an offshore oilfield
54
55
near Prudhoe Bay was consistent with ACMP. Under ACMP,
projects impacting Alaska’s coastline must undergo a review to de56
termine the project’s consistency with ACMP standards. Greenpeace alleged that DCG had failed to assess the cumulative impacts
of the Northstar project, and that DCG did not utilize adequate information in allowing certain aspects of the project to move for57
ward. In affirming the DCG’s consistency determination, the supreme court held that the broad definition of “cumulative effects”

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 266.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 43.080(a) (2003).
Garner, 63 P.3d at 266, 267.
Id. at 272.
Id.
79 P.3d 591 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 592.
ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.010 (Michie 2003).
Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 592.
Id.
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advocated by Greenpeace was not supported by prior case law, the
58
state constitution, or the state attorney general’s opinions. Under
Alaska Law, DCG was only required to conduct a “whole project
analysis” to determine cumulative impacts, as opposed to a broader
59
definition that would assess the likelihood of future impacts. The
court further held that the consistency review of the Northstar
project was not improperly phased by the premature issuing of
60
permits by DCG. The court held that Alaska law did not require
that the project be phased, and therefore the issuing of permits was
61
not premature.
In Grimm v. Wagoner,62 the supreme court held that Senatorelect Wagoner’s failure to disclose several financial interests did
not violate an Alaska statute that required all candidates to dis63
Alaska’s Public Official Financial
close their financial affairs.
64
Disclosure Law requires candidates for elected public office in
Alaska to file disclosure reports with an “‘accurate representation’
65
A candidate for the State Senate,
of their financial affairs.”
Wagoner filed his financial statements in May 2002 and was elected
66
in November of the same year. Later that month, two voters sued
to enforce the Public Official Financial Disclosure Law, alleging
67
that Wagoner failed to disclose some of his financial affairs. The
superior court found in favor of Wagoner on two alternative theo68
ries. First, if this case were treated as an election contest under
Title 15, the plaintiffs’ claim would fail because they did not show
69
that Wagoner’s omissions affected the election results. In the alternative, the superior court held that Wagoner’s statements satisfied the “substantial compliance” requirement and were thus satis70
factory. The supreme court affirmed, applying the substantial
71
compliance standard. Tracking the superior court’s reasoning, the
supreme court held that of Wagoner’s eight omissions, only two

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id.
77 P.3d 423 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 438.
ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(a) (Michie 1998).
Grimm, 77 P.3d at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
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were required disclosures; the supreme court found that these two
disclosure violations were trivial, and thus that Wagoner substan72
tially complied with the Public Official Financial Disclosure Law.
73
In Hamrick v. State, the court of appeals held that in order to
revoke an inmate’s probation for failure to join a court-ordered
treatment program, the Department of Corrections must make it
clear to the inmate that his failure to comply will violate his proba74
tion. After being convicted of a sexual abuse charge, Floyd Hamrick was sentenced and offered probation if he successfully com75
pleted an approved sexual offender treatment program. Hamrick
filed an application with a treatment center which subsequently lost
76
the application. After the Department of Corrections transferred
Hamrick to Arizona, a probation officer checked his application
and informed him that it was misplaced and that he would need to
77
file a second application. Hamrick waited approximately nine
months to file a new application, at which time there was not
enough time left on his sentence to complete the program; there78
fore, his application was rejected. Since Hamrick was unable to
complete a court-ordered treatment program, the Department of
79
Corrections filed a petition to revoke his probation. The court of
appeals stated that before the Department of Corrections could revoke Hamrick’s probation, it had a duty to make clear to Hamrick
that his noncompliance would result in termination of his proba80
tion. Hamrick was never ordered to fill out the application or to
submit it by a specific time, and he was never informed that his
failure to apply for a treatment program would result in termination of his probation; therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
81
superior court’s order revoking Hamrick’s probation.
In Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian Corp.,82
the supreme court reversed a finding of implied federal preemption
of borough taxes concerning uncommitted space in a building oc83
cupied by a federally-regulated Indian health clinic. In 1997, the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 434-37.
64 P.3d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 176.
See id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178-79.
75 P.3d 1042 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1044.
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United States transferred land in Ketchikan to the Ketchikan In84
dian Corporation (“KIC”). On appeal to the Borough Board of
Equalization, the KIC was granted a sixty percent tax exemption
for the five-story building it had constructed to house a federally85
funded Indian Health Service clinic. Questions of implied federal
preemption with regard to the taxation of Native American property require a balancing of federal policy against state interests in
86
taxation. The supreme court held that: (1) the uncommitted space
in the KIC building could not be considered part of any comprehensive and pervasive federal oversight because there had been no
determination as to its use; and (2) the state’s interests were not inconsequential because the taxes assessed would be in exchange for
the governmental functions the state provides to the property in
87
question. The court remanded to determine a proper apportion88
ment between clinic and non-clinic use for tax purposes.
89
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney, the supreme court
held that clerks reviewing proposed ballot initiatives under Alaska
Statutes section 29.26.110(a)(4) “must presume an initiative to be
90
constitutional absent clear authority establishing its invalidity.”
When Edward Mahoney attempted to file an initiative petition
proposing mayoral term limits, the Kodiak Island Borough clerk
refused to certify the application, primarily on the grounds that sec91
tion 29.26.110(a)(4) prohibited her from doing so. The statute
provides that a clerk may only certify applications that “would be
92
enforceable as a matter of law.” The Borough argued that because mayoral term limits had not yet been ruled constitutional in
Alaska, the clerk could not conclude with certainty that the initia93
tive proposed would be enforceable. The superior court rejected
the Borough’s argument, holding that this interpretation of the
statute would undermine the purpose of ballot initiatives, “depriv[ing] the voters of access to the initiative process for all issues
94
The supreme court affirmed the lower
of first impression.”
court’s decision, holding that under section 29.26.110(a)(4), a clerk

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1046.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
71 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 900.
Id. at 898.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110(a)(4) (Michie 2002).
Kodiak Island Borough, 71 P.3d at 898.
Id. at 899.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

124

05/18/04 2:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[21:1

may only reject petitions that violate constitutional restrictions regarding initiatives or that propose substantive ordinances that are
95
“clearly unconstitutional.”
In Koyukuk River Basin Moose Co-Management Team v.
96
Board of Game, the supreme court held that the decision of the
Board of Game (“Board”) to distribute up to four hundred general
hunting permits in the Koyuk Controlled Use Area (“KCUA”) was
not subject to the limitations of Alaska’s sustained yield require97
ments in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258. The Koyukuk River
Basin Moose Co-Management Team brought this appeal against
the Board, arguing that the Board’s authorization of general permits violated Alaska’s sustained yield requirements regarding the
98
moose population in the KCUA. The supreme court stated that
sustained requirements only apply to game populations that have
been designated as distinct game populations for management pur99
poses. The court then held that Alaska Administrative Code section 85.045 merely created a controlled use area by setting permit
100
limits and did not designate a manageable game population. The
court further held that the decision not to manage moose in the
KCUA as a distinct game population was within the Board’s dis101
cretion. Therefore, the Board was not subject to sustained yield
requirements, and the lower court’s decision in favor of the Board
102
of Game was affirmed.
In Koyukuk River Tribal Task Force on Moose Management v.
103
Rue, the supreme court held that an organization is a public interest litigant, which is not subject to paying awarded attorney’s
fees, when the organization can show that its members possess no
104
economic interest in the organization’s suit. The Koyukuk River
Tribal Task Force sued the Board of Game (“Board”), alleging
that its allowance of increased moose hunting, which contributed to
decreasing moose populations, violated the Alaska Constitution
105
and selected statutes. The superior court dismissed the case on
summary judgment, noting that the Task Force had not exhausted

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 900.
76 P.3d 383 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
63 P.3d 1019 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1020.
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all administrative remedies.106 The Board then petitioned for par107
tial costs and attorney’s fees, which the Superior Court granted.
The Task Force contested the fees, stating that it was a public in108
terest litigant, and therefore exempt. Using the four-part public
interest litigant analysis developed by the court in Anchorage Daily
109
News v. Anchorage School District, the supreme court found that
the Task Force met the first three requirements, but its status un110
Under the fourth reder the fourth requirement was unclear.
quirement the Task Force must not have a “sufficient economic in111
The supreme court therefore remanded the
terest to file suit.”
case, pending a determination of the Task Force’s membership and
112
the members’ economic interests in suing the Board.
113
In Palmer v. Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme court
held that the voting practices of the Police and Fire Retirement
114
Board were valid and constitutional, and that conflicting findings
115
from a second board were not given preclusive effect. Appellant
Geoffrey Palmer applied for occupational disability benefits after
heart problems that he deemed were related to his work as a police
116
officer. The Board twice denied his application, determining that
117
his heart problems were not work-related. Palmer challenged the
Board’s practice that five out of eight possible members were re118
quired to approve the award of benefits, but the court applied the
three-part test for procedural due process from Mathews v. El119
dridge, and determined that there was no deprivation of due pro120
cess. The court also held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination that Palmer’s problems were health121
related did not warrant preclusive effect, because the parties
there were not in privity with the parties before the Police and Fire

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
803 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1990).
Koyukuk, 63 P.3d at 1021-22.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1022.
65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 838.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Palmer, 65 P.3d at 841.
Id. at 842.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

126

05/18/04 2:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[21:1

Retirement Board.122 Although there was a rebuttable presumption that Palmer’s condition was work-related, the Board’s findings
were all supported by substantial evidence, so Palmer’s challenge
123
Reliance on a particular doctor’s testimony was not a
failed.
violation of the superior court’s order, and it was also supported by
124
substantial evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s
125
decision to deny Palmer occupational disability benefits.
In Wendte v. State Board of Real Estate Appraisers,126 the supreme court upheld suspension of a real estate license based on the
Board of Real Estate Appraisers’ finding that a theft conviction
127
was a crime of moral turpitude that warranted such action.
Wendte was convicted of stealing over $250,000 from several nonprofit sports organizations through his connections as a volunteer
128
with financial services matters. The Board found that Wendte’s
offense constituted “a crime of moral turpitude” under Alaska
Statutes section 08.87.210(2) sufficient to suspend his real estate li129
cense. The court rejected Wendte’s defense of double jeopardy
because suspension of a professional license is not considered
“punishment,” but rather serves to protect the public from being
130
harmed by unfit professionals. The court also rejected any argument that the Board failed to base its decision on relevant and cur131
rent information, stating that Wendte’s argument was misplaced.
Despite the fact that the theft was not in the course of Wendte’s
professional duties, the court found that the Board did have the
authority and did properly sanction Wendte under section
08.87.210(2), which permits the use of disciplinary powers when a
132
real estate appraiser is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
133
In Whalen v. Hanley, the supreme court upheld legislative
immunity for legislators who were merely acting within the scope
134
of their legislative duties. Alaska Marine Highway System employee Ronald Whalen had been under investigation with regard to

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 843.
Id. at 843-44.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 849.
70 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1091-92.
63 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 258-259.
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his eligibility status for cost-of-living-differential payments.135 After
state legislators, including Defendant Representatives Mark Hanley and Richard Foster, conducted a meeting of the House Finance
Committee, Whalen alleged that previously dismissed cold payment claims against him were made public when an earlier memorandum discussing those claims was attached to the meeting’s min136
Whalen sued Hanley and Foster for defamation, arguing
utes.
that the legislators were acting outside the scope of their legislative
duties when questioning the previous memorandum and therefore
were not entitled to protection from suit through legislative immu137
Because the state legislative immunity clauses were patnity.
terned after federal clauses, the supreme court employed the
United States Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of federal
legislative immunity, which declines to impose liability regardless
of whether the Court considers the legislative acts useful or neces138
Because there was no showing here that the legislators
sary.
acted outside the scope of their legislative duties, the supreme
court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the
139
defendants.
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n,140 the supreme court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar the admission of evidence that would supplement, rather than contradict,
141
an existing contract. Froines was a fisherman who had entered
into yearly contracts with the Valdez Fisheries Development Asso142
ciation (“Association”) to be a member of its fleet. The Association’s Board of Directors refused to renew Froines’ fishing contract
for the 1998 season following his lack of participation in a strike
143
Froines sued,
protesting the prices offered by local processors.
alleging that the Association breached its policy of retaining all but
144
the least productive vessel in the fleet. The superior court held
that the parol evidence rule prohibited admission of the Association’s production policy for the purpose of determining whether
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257-58.
Id.
Id. at 258-59.
75 P.3d 83 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
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the fishing contract was renewable.145 The parties agreed that this
ruling effectively granted summary judgment to the Association,
146
and the court entered a final judgment against Froines. The supreme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment for the Association, holding that proof of the renewal policy
would supplement, rather than contradict, the terms of the vessel
contract arrangement, and was therefore not necessarily subject to
147
the parol evidence rule. The court acknowledged that the lower
court correctly conducted a three-part test that considered whether
the contract was integrated, the meaning of the contract, and
148
whether prior agreements conflicted with the integrated writing.
However, the court held that the lower court did not properly consider extrinsic evidence in addressing the first two issues: integra149
The lower court found that the fishing contion and meaning.
tract was a partial expression of the parties’ agreement; therefore,
Froines’ extrinsic evidence of a renewal policy should have been
initially considered because it was not inconsistent with the charter
150
agreements.
In Hawken Northwest, Inc. v. State,151 the supreme court held
that a bidder on a laboratory space was entitled to an award based
152
on breach of contract. After winning the construction bid for a
153
new space and commencing construction, Plaintiff Hawken
signed two different releases, absolving the Department of Ad154
Later, however,
ministration against any construction claims.
Hawken argued that both releases were void due to the economic
155
Economic distress supdistress under which they were signed.
ports invalidation of a contract when: (1) one party involuntarily
accepted the terms of another; (2) circumstances permitted no
other alternative; and (3) the circumstances were the result of coer156
cive acts by the other party. Arguments for the invalidation of
the first release failed to prove the second prong, so it was upheld

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 89.
76 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Id.
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as valid.157 Arguments for the second release failed to prove the
158
third prong so it was also upheld as valid. Furthermore, no bad
159
Therefore, the sufaith was proven to invalidate the contract.
160
preme court upheld the department’s award.
In Jerue v. Millett,161 the supreme court held that (1) neither
the shareholders nor the directors of a corporation were prevailing
parties in a derivative action, and, thus neither were entitled to attorney’s fees; and (2) the directors were not entitled to indemnifi162
Ingalik, an Alaska Native village
cation from the corporation.
corporation, was involuntarily dissolved by the state because it
163
failed to report or pay taxes. The shareholders then filed a derivative action asking the court to compel the directors of Ingalik to
164
However, the
hold an annual meeting to rectify the situation.
shareholders did not make a formal request to the directors before
165
filing suit. Subsequently, the directors voluntarily reinstated the
166
corporation. After reinstatement, the superior court granted the
167
motion to dismiss the action as moot. The shareholders and directors then filed motions under Civil Rule 82 for recovery of attorney’s fees, claiming that they were the prevailing party in the
168
suit. The directors also filed a motion for indemnification by the
169
corporation. The superior court awarded fees and indemnification to the directors and found that the shareholders were not pre170
171
vailing parties. The shareholders appealed. The supreme court
held that the shareholders and the directors were not prevailing
parties because the shareholders had failed to make a demand to
the directors before filing suit, as required by Alaska Statutes sec172
tion 10.06.435(c), and had not met the exception to the statute.
The court also held that the directors were not prevailing parties
because they did not demonstrate that their efforts to reinstate the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 378.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
66 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 751.
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corporation were not the result of the suit.173 Therefore, the supreme court refused to award attorney’s fees to either party or to
174
indemnify the directors.
In Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. State, Department of Trans175
portation and Public Facilities, the supreme court applied the substantial evidence standard to a decision made by a state commissioner concerning the exercise of a termination-for-convenience
176
clause in a contract. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. (“Quality”) entered into a contract with the State Department of Transportation
177
to widen a state road. The contract included a termination-forconvenience clause that allowed the state to terminate the contract
178
at will. Shortly after the contract was issued, the project ran into
179
Subsequently,
an obstacle and the state exercised the clause.
Quality claimed that under the terms of the contract the state owed
180
Quality over $4.5 million. A commissioner from the Department
of Transportation reviewed Quality’s claims and awarded Quality
181
roughly a third of what it had requested. Quality appealed to the
supreme court, which affirmed all but one of the commissioner’s
182
findings because the findings were based on substantial evidence.
The court commented that the commissioner’s resolutions did not
have to be the best solution in order to meet the substantial evi183
dence standard.
In Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp.,184 the supreme court af185
Sharefirmed the superior court’s judgment for Huna Totem.
holders of Huna Totem filed a class action alleging that proxy in186
The superior court found
formation was materially misleading.
that while there were some omissions, the information was not ma187
terially misleading on the whole. First, the supreme court deter188
mined that the superior court applied the correct legal test. Re173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
71 P.3d 865 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 869-70.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 868 n.1.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 869, 882.
Id. at 878.
76 P.3d 391 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
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lying on Brown v. Ward,189 the supreme court held that proxy materials are materially misleading only if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [them] impor190
tant in deciding how to vote.” The supreme court found no merit
to the shareholders’ claims that the superior court wrongly imposed
191
a scienter requirement. Second, the supreme court affirmed the
192
factual finding that the omissions were not materially misleading.
193
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.
In Wyller v. Madsen,194 the supreme court held that a partner’s
own wrongful acts partially contributing to the partnership’s dissolution prevented that partner from collecting damages for wrong195
ful dissolution. Wyller, along with Madsen and three other indi196
viduals, formed a partnership to manage a single office building.
The partnership authorized approximately $120,000 in improve197
ments to the office building. However, Madsen subsequently approved repairs in addition to those authorized, with the cost of im198
In response, Wyller refused to
provements totalling $257,000.
authorize payment for any of the improvements, including those
199
Consequently, the contractor
approved by the partnership.
200
brought suit and the court ordered the partnership to dissolve.
The supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err
in finding Wyller partially responsible for the dissolution, as Wyller’s unjustified denial of responsibility for the authorized improvements contributed to the contractor’s suit and the subsequent
201
The fact that unauthorized imdissolution of the partnership.
provements were made did not excuse Wyller from responsibility
202
Therefor those improvements the partnership had approved.
fore, as Wyller’s own acts were partially responsible for the dissolu-

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 251.
Skaflestad, 76 P.3d at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
69 P.3d 482 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 486.
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tion, he could not collect damages from his partners for wrongful
203
dissolution under Alaska Statutes section 32.05.330(b).
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Fletcher v. Trademark Construction, Inc.,204 the supreme
court affirmed the dismissal of a contract action under Civil Rule
205
Alaska Electric, a subcontractor, brought suit against
41(b).
Trademark, the general contractor, for an alleged $200,000 owed
206
under a construction subcontract. The trial judge granted Trade207
mark’s motion to dismiss, and Alaska Electric appealed. Alaska
Electric challenged the superior court’s interpretation of Civil Rule
41(b) on two grounds. First, Alaska Electric argued that the superior court should have waited to rule until after Trademark had
208
presented its case. The court rejected this argument, holding that
209
Next, Alaska
Civil Rule 41(b) imposes no such requirement.
Electric argued that the trial court must construe evidence in the
plaintiff’s favor when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Civil
210
Rule 41(b). The court rejected this interpretation, holding that
the superior court did not err in refusing to draw inferences in the
211
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior
plaintiff’s favor.
212
court’s dismissal under Civil Rule 41(b).
In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. State,213 the supreme court held
that a second lawsuit brought by the Alliance was barred by res ju214
The Alliance first sued the Alaska Board of Game
dicata.
claiming that the composition of the board members violated the
215
Alaska Constitution. The superior court dismissed the Alliance’s
claim; immediately thereafter, the Alliance filed another suit
216
Although the superior court did not issue a
against the State.
finding of fact or conclusions of law when it dismissed the Alliance’s first claim, the supreme court found the dismissal still had
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 488.
80 P.3d 725 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id. at 732-33.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 724.
74 P.3d 201 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
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res judicata effect.217 Next, the supreme court found that the supe218
rior court’s dismissal was an adjudication on the merits. Relying
219
upon Baker v. Carr, the court determined that the political ques220
Finally, the
tion doctrine was a substantive basis for dismissal.
221
The
court found that the two suits involved the same parties.
court stated that the Alliance could not defeat res judicata by substituting one state entity for another when the claim is based on the
222
same conduct. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order granting the state’s motion to dismiss on res judi223
cata grounds.
In Brandner v. Agre,224 the supreme court held that the district
court had jurisdiction over a case involving a contractor’s substan225
Plaintiff Mitial compliance with state licensing requirements.
chael Brandner brought suit as a cross-claim to Defendant James
Agre’s suit seeking payment for construction work performed for
226
Brandner. Brandner claimed that since Agre was not a licensed
contractor at the time they contracted for the work, he was barred
from bringing an action for compensation; in response, Agre
claimed that he was permitted to bring an action for compensation
because he substantially complied with the contractor licensing
227
statute. The district court judge then referred the case to a superior court judge who appointed the district court judge to complete
228
Brandner argued that it was improper to resume the
the trial.
229
trial after its transfer to superior court. The supreme court held
that since resolving the question of Agre’s substantial compliance
was necessary and incidental to his compensation claim, it did not
become an equitable action and, therefore, the district court had
230
jurisdiction over the case.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Alaska Wildlife Alliance, 74 P.3d at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 209.
80 P.3d 691 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693-94.
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In Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River,231 the supreme
court upheld an award of enhanced partial attorney fee’s under
232
Civil Rule 82. Concerned Citizens filed suit against landowners,
including the Cizeks, for attempting to use their property as an air233
strip under a right held by the former owner. Concerned Citizens
prevailed in the suit and then filed a motion to receive attorney
234
fees. The trial court granted the motion and awarded Concerned
235
Citizens enhanced attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82(b)(3). According to Civil Rule 82(b)(2), if a case goes to trial but does not
result in money damages, the court is to award the prevailing party
236
thirty percent of the “necessarily incurred” attorney fees. However, the court can award more than thirty percent under Civil
237
Rule 82(b)(3) if the court clearly states its reasons for doing so.
In this case, the trial court awarded Concerned Citizens more than
thirty percent because Concerned Citizens had been “required to
participate in extensive and sometimes unduly repetitive motion
238
practice, most of it generated by the Cizek[s’] attorney.” The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision because the trial
court stated its reasons for the enhancement and did not abuse its
239
discretion.
In Conservatorship Estate of K.H. v. Continental Insurance
240
Co., the supreme court held that actions for breach of fiduciary
241
duty and fraud were not barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants acted as conservators for K.H., a mentally ill veteran who
242
inherited a significant sum of money. When the Office of Public
Advocacy (“OPA”) took over as K.H.’s conservator, it discovered
243
OPA initiated suit
that his funds had been severely depleted.
244
against the defendants for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
OPA filed these claims over one year after it took over as conser-

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

71 P.3d 845 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 851, 854.
Id. at 848.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id. at 848, 851.
Id. at 851.
73 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 591.
Id.
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vator.245 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing
246
that the six month statute of limitations had expired. The supe247
rior court granted the motion and dismissed all claims. On K.H.’s
appeal, the supreme court found that the claims were not time
barred because the defendants had not filed a final report disclos248
ing all financial matters. Accordingly, the court reversed the su249
perior court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
250
In Crosby v. Hummell, the supreme court held that the lower
court’s ruling on a negligence per se claim did not need to be overturned on the basis of jury instructions, its summary judgment deci251
sion, or admittance of evidence. Plaintiff Crosby appealed from a
judgment denying a wrongful death claim for the loss of her son,
which was based on the allegation that defendant Hummell had
been negligent per se by permitting Crosby’s son to drive in viola252
tion of Alaska Statutes section 28.15.281(b). Crosby argued first
that the lower court had committed error by listing all elements of
negligence per se in its jury instruction instead of specifying that
253
only one element of the claim was in dispute. The supreme court
upheld the lower court’s instruction, reasoning that more than one
254
element of the claim actually remained in dispute and, even absent that fact, that a complete description of a claim only aids the
255
jury in properly applying the facts before it. The supreme court
also rejected Crosby’s second argument that a portion of Hummell’s answer to Crosby’s complaint constituted a binding judicial
admission concerning the issue of permission, which necessitated
256
summary judgment of the negligence claim in her favor. The supreme court held that Hummell’s answer was ambiguous and thus
257
failed to qualify as a judicial admission, which must be a “clear,
258
deliberate, and unequivocal statement of fact.” In addition, the
supreme court held that because Crosby litigated the issue at trial,

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 596.
63 P.3d 1022 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027-28.
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the lower court had been entitled to apply Civil Rule 15(b), which
allows courts to treat litigated issues as under dispute even if such
259
issues are not disputed in the pleadings.
260
In Doxsee v. Doxsee, the supreme court held that a jury instruction on aggravation of injuries that does not specifically describe the plaintiff’s burden of proof does not qualify as reversible
261
error in an aggravation case. In July 1996, Autumn Doxsee un262
derwent neck surgery to alleviate her neck pain. The next month,
her husband Adrian Doxsee was driving Autumn to a doctor’s ap263
pointment and rear-ended another vehicle. Autumn suffered
more neck pain and filed a negligence suit against Adrian and his
264
The trial court held
insurer, Progressive Insurance Company.
that, as admitted, Adrian was negligent, but awarded Autumn only
265
After granting Progressive’s motion for at$9,358 in damages.
torney’s fees, the court entered a final judgment against Autumn
266
for $24,763.53. Autumn appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court
improperly failed to give a jury instruction explaining the standard
267
of proof for claims of “aggravation of pre-existing injury;” (2) the
trial court “erroneously denied her motions for additur or a new
268
trial;” and (3) the attorney’s fees award was erroneously large be269
cause it included Progressive’s legal fees, and not just Adrian’s.
After review by the court of appeals, the supreme court held that
the jury instructions were sufficient and that Autumn’s proposed
270
instruction would not have affected the verdict. The court also
held that the trial court should not have granted her motion for ad271
ditur because there was no abuse of discretion by that court, and
that the attorney’s fees must include the costs of both Adrian’s and
272
The supreme court affirmed the trial
Progressive’s defenses.
273
court’s defense verdict and award.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
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Id. at 228-29.
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In Freitas v. Alaska Radiology Associates, Inc.,274 the supreme
court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by admit275
ting testimony at trial about a clinic’s mammogram procedures.
The Freitases sued a radiology clinic for medical malpractice,
claiming that it negligently failed to detect cancerous lesions on
276
Mrs. Freitas’ mammograms. During trial, the judge admitted testimony by a doctor about breast positioning during mammograms
277
at the clinic. The Freitases argued that it was error to permit this
testimony because it was opinion evidence that unfairly raised a
new defense, and that the testimony should have been disclosed be278
fore trial. The supreme court held that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion, because the doctor’s testimony was primarily
factual and the expert opinions offered were not core liability is279
sues in this case. The Freitases further argued that the superior
court erred when it gave a jury instruction that set out a potential
basis for finding medical malpractice, claiming that the instruction
was incomplete because it did not inform the jurors that they could
find negligence if the doctor possessed the necessary knowledge
280
and skill but acted in the wrong way. The court held that there
was no plain error because the Freitases failed to object at trial and
281
the instruction was not misleading.
In Friends of Cooper Landing v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,282
the supreme court held that a ruling by a borough board of adjustment concerning a decision about land use by a local planning
commission was a judicial decision and thus reviewable by a supe283
rior court. Friends of Cooper Landing (“Friends”) appealed the
Kenai Peninsula Borough Planning Commission Plat Committee’s
(“Planning Commission”) approval of a piece of land for develop284
ment. The decision was appealed to the Borough Board of Adjustment (“Board”), back to the Planning Commission, and subse285
quently back to the Board. In each case the original decision was

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

80 P.3d 696 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 701-02.
79 P.3d 643 (Alaska 2003).
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YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

138

05/18/04 2:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[21:1

upheld.286 Friends then appealed the last decision by the Board to
287
The superior court, however, dismissed the
the superior court.
case, claiming that Friends lacked jurisdiction to bring the appeal
288
Acbecause the Board’s decision was legislative, not judicial.
289
cording to Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, a decision by a
legislative body is only subject to review if the decision is quasi290
judicial and not legislative. However, on appeal to the supreme
court, the court ruled that the purpose of the Board’s review was to
render an adjudicative response to the Planning Committee’s deci291
Therefore, the susion; thus, the decision was quasi-judicial.
292
preme court reversed and remanded the superior court’s holding.
293
In Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme court
held that a court has an obligation to inform a pro se litigant who
clearly indicates her desire to withdraw deemed admissions of the
proper procedures for doing so and should permit the litigant to
294
withdraw those admissions. Brenda Genaro, acting pro se, filed a
295
lawsuit against the Municipality of Anchorage. Subsequently, she
296
declared bankruptcy and failed to respond to any court requests.
Believing that her bankruptcy trustee, who had previously been
substituted as the real party in interest in the case before abandoning it, had already complied with the Municipality’s discovery
297
requests, Genaro failed to respond to the requests for admissions.
The superior court granted the Municipality’s subsequent motion
for summary judgment, stating that Genaro’s failure to respond to
298
the requests meant that the requests were deemed admitted.
While Genaro never made an express request of help from the superior court, the supreme court found that her timely opposition to
the summary judgment motion and her numerous statements at
pretrial conference sufficiently demonstrated her effective desire to
299
withdraw her deemed admissions. Therefore, it was an abuse of

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
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296.
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Id. at 644.
Id.
21 P.3d 883 (Alaska 2001).
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Id.
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discretion not to inform her of the proper procedures for the action
300
she was attempting to accomplish. The supreme court reversed
the grant of summary judgment and remanded to the superior
court with direction to permit Genaro to withdraw her deemed
301
admissions.
In Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n,302 the supreme court
held that it is an abuse of a court’s discretion to dismiss a pro se
litigant’s case for failure to adhere to pretrial procedure if the court
303
has not first explained the basics of the procedure to the litigant.
Gilbert, a resident at Nina Plaza Condominiums, filed a pro se law
suit against the Nina Plaza Condominium Association and several
of its residents for wrongfully excluding Gilbert from ownership
privileges and decision-making because of Gilbert’s sex and dis304
ability. While preparing for trial, Gilbert made multiple attempts
to obtain discovery documents from Nina Plaza, but the association
305
did not comply with Gilbert’s requests. Gilbert informed the superior court on multiple occasions that Nina Plaza was withholding
306
When the case came before the superior court, the
discovery.
judge dismissed the case, finding that both parties had failed to
307
The superior court
comply with the pretrial scheduling order.
stated that Gilbert should have filed a motion to compel Nina Plaza
308
to produce the discovery. Gilbert asserted that she was “unaware
309
of this legal procedure.” The supreme court reversed the supe310
rior court’s holding. The superior court had a duty to relax procedural requirements and to inform Gilbert of proper procedure
because Gilbert was a pro se litigant and she had informed the su311
perior court that she was having trouble with discovery.
312
In Inman v. Inman, the supreme court held that a court may
313
relieve a party from a final divorce judgment that is void and hold
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a new trial to equitably divide the estate.314 Homer Inman filed for
divorce from Peggy Inman in November 1982, and a default di315
vorce decree was entered in Peggy’s absence. In September 1999,
Peggy filed a motion seeking partition of Homer’s retirement bene316
The Court upheld the judgfits, which the trial court granted.
ment, reasoning that the 1982 divorce decree was void for want of
personal jurisdiction and that therefore Peggy may be relieved
317
318
from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). The court further held that the trial court did not err by holding a new trial in
order to equitably divide the estate after setting aside the divorce
319
decree as void. Despite the delay in filing Peggy’s motion for relief, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying
320
Homer’s laches defense as a matter of equity.
321
In Lawson v. Helmer, the supreme court held that defamatory testimony of a witness in a judicial proceeding, which is relevant to the suit, is “absolutely privileged,” and that such witnesses
322
are immune from subsequent suits for libel or slander. Ernie and
Linda Helmer, former friends of Lawson, testified against Lawson
323
in a custody proceeding concerning Lawson’s child. Later, Lawson filed a defamation suit against the Helmers, claiming that they
324
had lied during their testimony in the earlier custody proceeding.
The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding
325
that Lawson’s claim failed as a matter of law. The court reiterated the long-standing rule that “defamatory testimony is privileged, and the witness granted immunity,” even if the testimony is
326
The court noted that good
intentionally false and malicious.
public policy favors this outcome, considering that the rule provides witnesses with the confidence to participate in a proceeding
327
On the
and allows them to speak freely and honestly in court.
other hand, the court found that parties are adequately protected
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from “witness misconduct” by the devices of cross-examination and
328
perjury claims.
In Marx v. Benzel,329 the supreme court held that an attorney
who has discussed a legal issue with one party cannot represent the
330
Marx sued Benzel
opposing party concerning that legal issue.
seeking to set aside the deed of a house that Marx conveyed to
331
Benzel’s attorney, Brattain, had previously met with
Benzel.
332
However, at that
Marx concerning a different legal matter.
meeting, Marx also informed Brattain about her dispute concern333
Subsequently, Brittain
ing the house she conveyed to Benzel.
wrote a letter to both Marx and Benzel stating that in the event of
an actual controversy regarding the conveyance of property, he
334
would not represent either Marx or Benzel. Nevertheless, Brit335
tain represented Benzel when Marx brought suit. The superior
court denied a motion seeking to disqualify Brittain as counsel for
336
Benzel. The supreme court, applying Rule 1.9(a) of the Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct, held that Brittain should have been
337
disqualified as Benzel’s counsel. “[A] lawyer may not represent a
new client in a substantially related matter in which the new client’s
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former cli338
ent.” Even though Brittain was not retained as Marx’s attorney,
the supreme court held that the relationship was effectively the
339
same as that covered by the rule. Therefore, the supreme court
reversed the superior court’s order denying the motion for disquali340
fication and remanded the case for further proceedings.
341
In Register v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
342
court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to withdraw their pleas.
The defendants were indicted for first-degree assault in connection
343
with a stabbing. As a result of a plea arrangement, they were al328.
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Id. at 338.
Id.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

142

05/18/04 2:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[21:1

lowed to plead no contest to second-degree assault.344 The victim
345
sued the defendants in civil court. As a result of their no-contest
plea, the defendants were estopped from contesting that they had
346
The defendants moved to withdraw their
assaulted the victim.
347
no-contest pleas, but the superior court denied their motions.
The defendants asserted that they had entered their pleas under a
mistaken understanding that their pleas could not be used against
348
The record indicated conflicting testithem in civil litigation.
mony regarding whether or not the defendants’ attorneys had informed them that their no-contest pleas could be used against them
349
in civil litigation. The superior court decided that the testimony
of the attorneys that they had properly informed their clients was
350
more credible. Additionally, the superior court was unconvinced
that the threat of civil liability would be enough to make the defendants reject the “rather lenient deal” offered to them in the plea
351
arrangement. The court of appeals found that these conclusions
352
were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the denial of the defen353
dants’ motions to withdraw their pleas was affirmed.
In Turner v. Alaska Communications Systems Long Distance,
354
Inc., the supreme court held that absent parties in a class action
cannot be held liable for attorney’s fees upon an adverse judg355
ment. Three former subscribers sued Defendants Alaska Communications Systems Long Distance, Inc. and Alaska Communications Systems Group, Inc. after they cancelled a long distance plan,
356
claiming breach and fraud. The court held that one factor limiting absent parties’ liability is the fact that the potential recovery
357
from a favorable judgment is so small. Imposing liability would
encourage opt-outs and “have a chilling effect on the important use
358
Furthermore, other jurisdictions’
of the class action device.”

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
78 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
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rulings on this issue helped guide the decision here.359 Overall, the
court determined that holding such parties liable would create inef360
ficiencies in the class action system.
361
In Williams v. Engen, the supreme court held that the purpose of Civil Rule 27 is to preserve known evidence, not to aid
362
searches for causes of action. Shortly after purchasing a home in
Juneau, the Engens discovered cracks in the foundation and
brought suit against the real estate agent, Williams, and the estate
363
for misrepresentation. The parties entered mediation on the mat364
ter and Williams offered to settle for $25,000. Meanwhile, the estate settled and allowed the sale to be rescinded, stating that the
365
Engens were still allowed to accept Williams’ settlement. Having
second thoughts, however, the Engens agreed to purchase the
366
home, and applied for refinancing. After the refinancing on the
367
home was completed, Williams sought the letter from the engineer who certified the problem in the foundation, but the Engens
368
Williams then petitioned the
refused to disclose the letter.
Alaska superior court under Civil Rule 27 in order to compel the
369
production of the letter, but was denied by the court. On appeal,
the supreme court upheld the decision, stating that Rule 27’s purpose is to preserve evidence rather than be used as a tool to discover causes of action, and that Williams’ case presented no exceptional reason to go beyond this purpose of preserving known
370
evidence.
In Wyatt v. State,371 the supreme court held that an agreement
reached in exchange for a stay of a wrongful death lawsuit was en372
forceable. Appellant Wyatt was convicted of first-degree murder
373
for the death of his wife. The estate of Wyatt’s late wife initiated
374
a wrongful death suit against him. As Wyatt appealed his crimi359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
80 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 746.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 747, 750.
65 P.3d 825 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 830.
Id. at 827.
Id.
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nal conviction, he sought a stay of the civil proceedings against
375
him. The estate agreed to the stay, and in exchange Wyatt agreed
to transfer all of the property to the estate if his criminal appeal
376
was unsuccessful. Wyatt’s conviction was affirmed by the court
377
The superior court then orof appeals and the supreme court.
378
dered that the property be transferred to the estate. Wyatt objected on the grounds that the agreement did not encompass all of
379
the property. He also claimed that the written agreement did not
380
accurately reflect the oral agreement reached in open court. The
superior court found against Wyatt on these points and denied his
381
motion for reconsideration. The supreme court examined the record and found that the oral agreement did encompass all of the
382
property and was accurately reflected by the written agreement.
383
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court’s decisions.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Anderson v. State,384 the supreme court held that Alaska
385
Anderson was
Statutes section 09.17.020(j) is constitutional.
awarded $600,000 in punitive damages in a wrongful discharge and
386
defamation suit. The state claimed it was owed half of the puni387
tive damages award under Alaska Statutes section 09.17.020(j).
Anderson then filed a motion seeking that the statute be declared
388
The court upheld the statute, holding specifiunconstitutional.
cally that the statute did not violate the takings clause or substan389
tive due process. The court found that there was no takings claim
because Anderson’s claim accrued after the date of the statute’s
390
enactment and that she had no reasonable expectations to the
whole punitive damages award since the statute was in effect at the

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 832.
78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 714.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 714-20.
Id. at 714-15.
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time her claim accrued.391 The court found that the statute did not
violate substantive due process because it was rationally related to
392
several legitimate interests.
393
In Brandon v. State, the supreme court held that a prison disciplinary hearing conducted by a single hearing officer is not a vio394
Brandon, a prison inlation of a prisoner’s due process rights.
mate, was charged with violating an administrative regulation
395
against possession of tobacco. A disciplinary hearing was held by
a single officer, after which Brandon was found guilty and sen396
tenced to punitive segregation. Brandon argued that the hearing
violated his due process rights because a single hearing officer can397
The court found
not guarantee fair and impartial adjudication.
no violation of due process under the principle that single hearing
officers are not presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary pro398
Brandon further argued that the disciplinary hearing
ceedings.
399
violated the final settlement agreement of Cleary v. Smith, a
class-action case settlement governing numerous aspects of prison
conditions in Alaska. The court held that Brandon’s hearing was
400
not prejudiced by any violation of that agreement.
In Evans v. Native Village of Selawik IRA Council,401 the supreme court held that failure to provide notice to a parent prior to
the resolution of adoption is a denial of the parent’s due process
402
rights. Evans, an unwed father, was denied paternal rights over
his son, K.D., when the Native Village of Selawik passed a resolution of adoption in favor of K.D.’s guardians without providing no403
tice to Evans prior to the resolution. The court held that notice
to a parent whose parental rights may be terminated is an essential
404
element of due process under the Alaska Constitution.

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 715.
Id. at 718.
73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1235.
24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2003).
Brandon, 73 P.3d at 1248.
65 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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In Herreid v. State,405 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s
406
Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) does not constitute an
improper infringement by the legislative branch into the duties of
407
the judicial branch. As part of a plea bargain, Herreid pled no
contest to a misdemeanor count of attempted third-degree sexual
408
Herreid was subsequently required to register as a sex
assault.
offender for fifteen years because his offense was considered a “sex
409
offense” under SORA. Herreid contested the application of the
Act to his situation, claiming that the registration requirement was
a punishment and that it was therefore unconstitutional for the
legislature not to allow the courts to modify the length of the registration requirement based on the circumstances of Herreid’s of410
fense. However, the court of appeals followed recent rulings by
the United States Supreme Court and held that the Act did not im411
Therepose punishment but was a “civil regulatory measure.”
fore, the court of appeals held that the Act did not “violate the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
412
branches.”
In Holding v. Municipality of Anchorage,413 the supreme court
held that a lessor prevented from advertising adult-oriented businesses by a code provision barring such advertising by those who
did not own the businesses is not exempt from the provision if he
414
leases space to parties authorized to advertise such businesses.
Anchorage issued five citations to Holding for advertising adultoriented businesses that operated on premises owned by Holding
but were leased by the business owners, who had the proper li415
censes and operated these businesses. The supreme court held
that the provision prohibiting non-owners from advertising applied
416
to Holding for two reasons. First, Holding did not have any
“grandfather right” to advertise simply because he owned the
417
premises. Second, the provision did not deprive Holding of his

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

69 P.3d 507 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6)(C)(i) (Michie 2002).
Herreid, 69 P.3d at 509.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 507-08.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 509.
63 P.3d 248 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251.
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constitutionally-protected right of commercial free speech because
the law directly advances the interests of Anchorage in a manner
418
that is not more restrictive than necessary. Therefore, the cita419
tions issued by Anchorage were proper.
In Holz v. Nenana City Public School District,420 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the School District
(“District”) was an “arm of the state” and therefore entitled to
421
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Rather, the District was akin to
a municipal corporation or other political subdivision without
422
Eleventh Amendment protection. Holz, an Alaskan Native, applied for a job with the Nenana City Public School as a classroom
423
aide. “The position was funded partially by an Indian Education
grant that included an Indian employment preference require424
ment.” Although Holz was considered the best qualified applicant by the classroom teacher, the position went to the wife of the
425
School Board President and a non-Alaskan native. Holz subsequently filed suit against the District and its officials, alleging that
they violated the Federal Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act and federal and state civil rights laws by failing to
426
The district court
hire her for several school district positions.
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that
the District satisfied the five-factor test articulated in Mitchell v.
427
Los Angeles Community College District and was immune from
428
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the Mitchell factors
suit.
yielded a different result. Regarding the first and most important
factor (whether a money judgment will be satisfied out of state
funds) the court noted that the relevant inquiry was whether
Alaska would be legally liable for money judgments against the
429
Because Alaska state law explicitly provides that the
District.
State is not responsible for judgments against school districts, the
court found that the first Mitchell factor weighed against finding

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 254.
Id. at 249.
347 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1177, 1180.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
861 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988).
Holz, 347 F.3d at 1178.
Id. at 1182.
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the District to be an arm of the state.430 The court also found that
the district court went “too far” in holding that under the second
Mitchell factor (whether the District performs central government
431
functions), education is an essential state function in Alaska. The
duty to operate public schools and thus to provide education is not
the duty of the state but is the duty of home rule cities such as Ne432
nana. The last three Mitchell factors (whether the District has the
power to sue and be sued, whether the District has the power to
take property in its own name, and whether the District is an entity
distinct from the state) weighed against a determination that the
433
District was an arm of the state. The court thus concluded that
434
the District was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
435
In Jacobus v. State, the court of appeals evaluated the constitutionality of certain amendments to Alaska Statutes section
15.13.010 et seq., which prescribe Alaska’s election campaign fi436
nance laws, and held that the statutes’ restriction on soft money
contributions to political parties by both individuals and corpora437
tions is constitutional, but that the statute’s limitation of volunteer professional services by individuals is an unconstitutional in438
The Alaska legislature
fringement of First Amendment rights.
enacted amendments to the law of campaign finance in 1996 in order to “restrict the influence of money on politics and prevent easy
439
Party activists
evasion of the barriers set up by the reforms.”
later filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the new limita440
tions imposed by the amendments on campaign contributions.
The court of appeals first held that the amendments’ limitation of
an individual’s right to contribute soft money to a political party is
441
not an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.
The court held that the state has a sufficiently important governmental interest in “preventing corruption, avoiding the appearance
of corruption, and averting the circumvention of provisions intended to combat corruption,” and that the amendments were

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 1185.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1188-89.
Id. at 1189.
338 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1105-06.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1105.
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closely tailored to further that interest.442 Second, the court held
that the amendments’ prohibition of corporate soft money contributions was constitutional because it was a closely tailored solution
to the governmental interests of avoiding the “danger of corruption
and the corrosive effects of wealth accumulated with the aid of the
443
Finally, the court held that the amendcorporate structure.”
ments’ limitation of volunteer professional services by individuals
to political parties was unconstitutional because the State provided
no sufficient governmental interest to override individuals’ First
444
Amendment rights.
In Malabed v. North Slope Borough,445 the Ninth Circuit held
that an ordinance granting preference in employment to members
of federally recognized Indian tribes violated the Alaska Constitu446
tion’s guarantee of equal protection. The North Slope Borough,
a political division of the State of Alaska, enacted an ordinance
447
giving preference in employment to Native Americans. The nonnative plaintiffs claimed they were denied employment because of
448
this ordinance. The Ninth Circuit asked the supreme court to de449
termine whether the ordinance violated the Alaska Constitution.
The supreme court held that the ordinance violated the Alaska
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection because the borough
lacked “a legitimate governmental interest” and because the pref450
The Ninth
erence was “not closely tailored to meet its goals.”
Circuit thus declared the ordinance invalid and declined to reach
451
plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims.
In Myers v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.,452 the supreme
court held that selling the right to receive future revenue from a
453
Alaska settled its
tobacco lawsuit settlement is constitutional.
claims against tobacco manufacturers in exchange for annual pay454
ments. The legislature then sold the rights to this revenue stream

442. Id. at 1110.
443. Id. at 1122.
444. Id. at 1124-25.
445. 335 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003).
446. Id. at 874.
447. Id. at 866.
448. Id. at 866-67.
449. Id. at 867-68.
450. Id. at 868 (citing Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416 (Alaska
2003)).
451. Id.
452. 68 P.3d 386 (Alaska 2003).
453. Id. at 394.
454. Id. at 387.
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for its present value and appropriated the proceeds for school im455
Myers, a taxpayer, sought a declaratory judgment
provements.
that this action violated the anti-dedication clause of the state con456
stitution. The superior court held that the legislature’s action was
457
However, the
constitutional, and the supreme court affirmed.
court did hold that the revenue from the tobacco settlement was
458
subject to the anti-dedication clause. The court then held that the
legislature’s sale of the right to this revenue stream was not an un459
The court found the legislature’s acconstitutional dedication.
460
First, the lawsuit settlement
tion permissible for four reasons.
was non-recurring, unlike other traditional sources of state reve461
nue. Second, the periodic nature of the settlement was a matter
462
of chance. A lump sum settlement would have freed the legisla463
ture to appropriate the funds. Third, lawsuit settlements are con464
sidered to be assets unlike taxes or licenses. Finally, the legisla465
ture must be allowed to manage these assets so as to control risk.
466
In Smith v. Doe I, the Supreme Court of the United States
467
held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”),
which applies retroactively, is nonpunitive, and thus does not vio468
late the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of sexual
abuse and were later required to register under SORA even
469
though they were convicted prior to its passage. SORA requires
a convicted sex offender to register personal and identifying information with the State Department of Corrections or local law en470
The State Department of Public Safety
forcement authorities.
then makes much of the information public via the Internet, including the offender’s name, place of employment, and crime for

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 388, 393.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Michie 2000).
Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
Id. at 91.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010(a), (b).
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which the offender was convicted.471 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy applied the rule that a retroactively-applied law violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause if either its purpose is punitive or its effects are so punitive as to negate the legislature’s nonpunitive in472
tent. The Court first concluded that the legislature’s intent in enacting SORA was to protect the public from sex offenders, which is
473
a civil and nonpunitive purpose. Then, in determining whether
SORA’s effects are punitive, the Court referred to various factors
474
In particular, the
outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.
Court focused on whether the regulatory scheme: (1) has been historically regarded as a punishment; (2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment; (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or (5)
475
The Court resolved
is excessive with respect to this purpose.
each of these issues in favor of a finding that SORA’s effects are
476
nonpunitive. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and held that SORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto
477
Clause.
In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson,478
the supreme court held that Alaska’s practice of charging nonresidents more than residents for commercial fishing licenses does not
479
violate the United States Constitution. The supreme court also
held, however, that the formula for determining the rate charged to
non-residents should consider the revolving loan fund that supports
developing fish enhancement projects: the “hatchery loan fund
480
This class action was brought by a group of nonsubsidy.”
resident commercial fishers who complained that they were being
charged three times the price for a commercial fishing permit as
481
were resident commercial fishers. The supreme court explained
that “[t]he class has failed to present any valid arguments as to why
we should reconsider” the position that residents and non-residents
482
The supreme court adcan be charged unequally for permits.

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-91.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93, 96.
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 97-105.
Id. at 105-06.
65 P.3d 851 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 875.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 875.
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justed the previously adopted formula used to calculate the rate
charged to non-residents to include consideration of the hatcheries
483
loan fund subsidy.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Procedure
484
In Baxter v. Alaska, the court of appeals upheld the allowance of certain evidence at trial, which was used to convict defendants of conspiracy to manufacture drugs, reasoning that such evi485
dence was legally obtained. Johnson was stopped by police for
driving with a burnt-out headlight and gave police permission to
486
search her car and person. The police discovered drugs in John487
son’s pockets, but arrested her only for driving without a license.
At the police station, the police again searched Johnson and examined her wallet, in which it found a piece of paper containing a
488
list of items needed to manufacture methamphetamine. Based on
this evidence, the police obtained a search warrant for Johnson’s
489
home, where the police found a methamphetamine lab. At trial
for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, Johnson and her
co-defendants argued first that the evidence was barred because
Johnson had not “knowingly and voluntarily” consented to the
490
The court of appeals ruled
search when stopped by the police.
that based on the “totality of the circumstances,” Johnson validly
491
consented to the search. The defendants next argued that even if
consent had been given, Johnson later withdrew her consent when
492
she hesitated before emptying her pockets for police. The court
of appeals denied this argument as well, holding that “[o]nce voluntary consent has been given . . . the person’s ‘lack of objection to
subsequent closely related entries and searches’ implies that the de493
fendant’s consent was not withdrawn.” The defendants also argued that the police’s search of Johnson’s wallet following her arrest was invalid because Johnson was arrested for driving without a
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

Id.
77 P.3d 19 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. (quoting Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1980)).
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license and searches “incident to arrest [are] limited to . . . evidence
494
The court ruled,
of the crime for which the arrest was made.”
however, that police are not limited to searching for evidence of
only the particular crime for which the defendant is arrested, but
also for “any crime for which the police have probable cause,” and
495
thus, this search was valid. Finally, the court held that the police
also had authority to read the paper inside Johnson’s wallet because the police had reason to believe that the item contained evidence of drug possession; specifically, the court held that the police
could validly search for evidence identifying the source of the
496
drugs.
In Bingaman v. State,497 the court of appeals held that though
Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) allows the admission of character evidence in domestic violence trials, a trial judge is still to act as a
gatekeeper to ensure that the proffered evidence is not irrelevant
498
or prejudicial. Bingaman was charged with assaulting his live-in
499
companion and sexually abusing her daughter. At trial, the judge
admitted, under Rule 404(b)(4), evidence of sixty prior instances of
500
Bingaman’s misconduct. However, only twenty percent of the instances dealt with the acts for which he was charged (assault and
sexual abuse of a minor), while the remainder dealt with unrelated
501
acts, such as degradation and intimidation of women. On appeal,
the court held that the trial judge violated Evidence Rules 402 and
403 by admitting irrelevant evidence and evidence of which its pro502
bative value is outweighed by its prejudicial harm. Accordingly,
503
the decision of the superior court was reversed.
In Black v. State,504 the court of appeals held that a challenge is
not filed when it is mailed, but rather when it is received by the
505
clerk of court. Black was charged with driving under the influ506
Before his trial he tried to file a peremptory
ence of alcohol.
challenge by mailing it within the five day window required by

494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.

Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28-29.
76 P.3d 398 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 417.
76 P.3d 417 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 418.
Id.
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Criminal Rule 25(d)(2), but the court rejected the attempt, stating
507
that it was untimely. The appellate court upheld the ruling, citing
the Alaska common law rule that a document is filed only when re508
ceived by the court.
In Carter v. State,509 the court of appeals held that a hotel guest
who fails to meet the check-out deadlines suffers diminution of privacy only with respect to the right of the hotel management, not
510
Carter and three
the police independently, to enter the room.
511
Police officers legally
other individuals occupied a hotel room.
512
entered the hotel room to arrest one of the other individuals.
However, two officers investigating Carter remained behind in the
room and ordered Carter to vacate the room, as it was one o’clock,
513
While observing Carter
the hotel’s stated check-out deadline.
gather his belongings, the police observed illicit drug parapherna514
lia. The court of appeals held that, depending on both the hotel’s
customary check-out policy and the specific factual circumstances
of the individual situation, a hotel guest may suffer a diminution of
his expectation of privacy with respect to the right of hotel man515
agement to enter the room. However, the guest neither loses all
expectation of privacy nor does the guest suffer a diminution of
516
Here, the hotel
privacy with respect to police, independently.
policy was to provide guests with leeway after the one o’clock
deadline, the clerk had specifically granted Carter such leeway, and
Carter continued to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
517
hotel room after one o’clock. Therefore, the police officers re518
The evimained in the hotel room without proper authority.
dence was therefore discovered illegally and could not be justified
519
The court ordered the evidence
under the plain view doctrine.
520
suppressed and the conviction reversed.

507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id. at 419.
72 P.3d 1256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1257.
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In Cole v. State,521 the court of appeals held that for an attorney
to be found incompetent, a prima facie case must be made demonstrating that she acted unreasonably in comparison with other attorneys skilled in criminal law and that her incompetence contrib522
uted to her client’s conviction. Cole was convicted of first-degree
523
murder. Subsequently, Cole applied for post-conviction relief on
the grounds that his lawyer was incompetent in two ways: (1) she
did not retain a forensic pathologist to explain the victim’s death;
and (2) she did not explain the parole he might have had if he had
524
instead pled guilty to second-degree murder. The superior court
found that, by neglecting to obtain a pathologist, Cole’s lawyer had
made a tactical choice which did not prejudice Cole’s case; consequently, it was no abuse of discretion for the superior court to deny
525
Cole’s ineffective counsel claim. Also, the court held that an attorney is not required to advise a client about the eligibility for parole under different plea options, and thus Cole failed to establish
526
his attorney’s incompetence in this regard as well.
527
In Coles v. State, the court of appeals found that there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the sentencing judge’s
finding that the defendant was a “worst offender” and, therefore,
merited the maximum sentence for felony driving while intoxicated
528
(“DWI”). A judge may only impose a maximum sentence on an
offender when there is sufficient evidence to find that the offender
529
Evidence regarding the present offense
is a “worst offender.”
and prior similar offenses determine when a defendant is a “worst
530
offender.” Based on Coles’ nine DWI convictions within a tenyear period, the court of appeals found that the sentencing judge
was authorized to invoke the maximum sentence of five years in
531
prison.
In Copeland v. State,532 the court of appeals rejected a defendant’s evidentiary claims and upheld his sentence as a valid exer-

521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

72 P.3d 322 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 324.
64 P.3d 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 151-52.
70 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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cise of judicial discretion.533 Copeland was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and nine counts of second-degree
534
On appeal, Copeland
sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old girl.
535
first challenged five evidentiary rulings from the lower court.
Three of these claims were not raised at trial and failed plain-error
536
review by the court of appeals. Of the remaining claims, Copeland argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for ac537
cess to the whole of the minor’s diary. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that Copeland was unable
to prove that the lack of access to the full diary was prejudicial to
538
him. The court also noted that Copeland had rejected the trial
court’s offer of an alternative way to check the diary for physical
539
tampering. Copeland also argued that the trial court erred by refusing to allow evidence from a previous trial that the minor may
540
Applying
have falsely accused someone of a similar crime.
541
Morgan v. State, the court of appeals held that “before evidence
of a prior false accusation of sexual misconduct can be admitted,
the proponent of this evidence must convince the trial judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prior accusation was both
542
actually and knowingly false.” The court found that although the
defendant had been acquitted in the earlier trial, the evidence of a
false accusation was still insufficient under this standard to allow
543
Finally, the court of appeals upheld the lower
the testimony.
544
Though the sentence exceeded the State v.
court’s sentence.
545
Jackson benchmark range, the court found that the longer sentence was reasonable considering the unusual seriousness of
546
Copeland’s offense.
In Crawford v. State,547 the court of appeals held that a search
of a car’s center console cannot be justified as a search incident to

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.

Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1122-27.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Copeland, 70 P.3d at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1128.
776 P.2d 320 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Copeland, 70 P.3d at 1127-28.
68 P.3d 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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arrest, as the console is not associated with the defendant’s per548
son. Such a search is only justified if it is a search for hidden
549
During a traffic stop for reckless driving, the police
weapons.
searched Crawford’s car and found a controlled substance in the
550
center console. This led to a charge of fourth-degree misconduct
551
Crawford moved to suppress
involving a controlled substance.
the evidence found in the console, arguing that the search was not a
552
lawful search incident to the arrest. The superior court denied
553
the motion. The court of appeals held that, because the console
was a closed container not associated with Crawford’s person, it
could only be opened if the police reasonably believed it contained
weapons or evidence of the crime for which Crawford was ar554
rested.
In Crouse v. Municipality of Anchorage,555 the court of appeals
held that a trial judge did not err in allowing a jury to revise its ver556
dict when it had mistakenly filled out the wrong jury form.
Crouse was mistakenly convicted for reckless driving instead of a
more severe charge of driving under the influence because the jury
557
filled out the wrong verdict form. Upon receiving the form, the
judge immediately recognized this error and sent the jury back with
558
the correct forms. Crouse argued that the court erred in inquir559
ing into the jurors’ intent. She further argued that allowing the
court staff to contact the jury regarding the verdict form deprived
her of her constitutional right to be present at every stage of her
560
trial. The court held that the district court did not err because a
trial court has discretion to question a jurors’ intent to ensure that
561
The court
the judgment accurately reflects the jury’s verdict.
562
therefore declined to reverse the decision.

548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

Id. at 1283.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. at 1283.
Id.
Id.
79 P.3d 660 (Alaska. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 665.
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In Dague v. State,563 the supreme court held that a trial court
erred in prohibiting a criminal defendant from reexamining the
State’s expert witness as to whether she had acted knowingly in the
564
death of a child. Dague admitted that she was responsible for the
death of a ten-month old child in her care; the issue at trial was
565
whether she acted knowingly. At trial, the superior court refused
to allow the defense to recall the State’s expert witness to substan566
tiate his earlier testimony about how abusive situations arise.
The court of appeals remanded to allow questioning of the state
expert as to whether he was qualified to answer the defense’s ques567
tioning and what he would have answered at trial. After receiving the superior court’s findings, the court of appeals determined
that the exclusion of his testimony was harmless error because it
568
would have only provided marginal support to the defense. On
appeal, the supreme court held that the mere fact that another witness testified on an issue does not foreclose the defendant’s right to
569
Therefore, the court reintroduce substantiating testimony.
versed the decision of the court of appeals, reasoning that the exclusion of the state expert’s testimony was reversible error because
570
of its potential to appreciably affect the jury’s verdict.
571
In Fowler v. State, the court of appeals held that an amendment to Alaska law making driving while intoxicated a felony with
two prior offenses within the past ten years was effective the day
after the governor signed it when the date specified by the legisla572
The Alaska legislature passed an
ture had already passed.
amendment to the driving while intoxicated statute that increased
the “look back” period to ten years; the amendment was to become
573
effective on the specified date of July 1, 2001. Under Alaska law,
a bill takes force on the ninetieth day after the governor signs it,
574
unless the legislature specifies otherwise. The governor, however,
did not sign the bill until July 3, two days after the legislature’s

563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.

81 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1107 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 2002)).
Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.070(a) (Michie 2002)).
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specified date.575 The next day, July 4, Fowler was arrested for
driving while intoxicated; he had two prior offenses within the pre576
ceding ten years but none within the preceding five years. His offense would be a felony if the bill were effective on or before July
4. Fowler argued that because the governor did not sign the bill
until after the date specified by the legislature, the bill did not take
577
effect until the ninetieth day after the governor signed it. The
court noted that when the legislature intended the law to be enacted on a specified date, it normally could anticipate that the governor would sign the law with time to spare, thus eliminating the
578
need for the ninety-day forewarning period. When the specified
date has already transpired by the time the governor signed the
bill, the court believed it was reasonable to assume that the legisla579
ture would want the law to take force as soon as possible. This
conclusion was consistent with the later-enacted Alaska Statutes
section 01.10.070(d), which was amended to say “if the specified . . .
effective date is in or before the day the governor signs the Act, . . .
the Act becomes effective at 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time, on
580
the day after the governor signs the Act. . . .” Thus, the law took
effect at 12:01 A.M. on July 4, 2001, and governed Fowler’s of581
fense.
In Grinols v. State,582 the supreme court held that a defendant
has a constitutional right to effective counsel in a first application
for post-conviction relief and therefore must be given the opportunity to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a second petition
583
for post-conviction relief. Grinols, convicted for sexual abuse of
a minor, claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
584
The
he litigated his first application for post-conviction relief.
supreme court held that the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution requires the right to counsel in a first application for post585
Therefore, as the right to counsel would be
conviction relief.
meaningless if that counsel was ineffective, the supreme court held
that the due process clause also requires that a defendant be given

575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1108-09.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1109.
74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 896.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 894.
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a chance to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a second peti586
tion for post-conviction relief. Furthermore, the court held that
as the right to effective counsel is based in the Alaska Constitution,
not the United States Constitution, the reach of the federal due
587
process clause was irrelevant to the case at hand.
588
In Hart v. State, the court of appeals affirmed an earlier decision that it was unnecessary for a pre-sentence investigator to obtain permission from the superior court before using records of informal involvement with the juvenile justice system to prepare a
589
pre-sentence report. Hart was convicted of third-degree assault,
and he had previous contacts with the juvenile justice system that
590
His predid not lead to formal adjudications of delinquency.
sentence report included information regarding these informal
591
complaints. Hart argued that on the basis of Alaska Statutes section 47.12.310(a), which states that all agency records concerning a
minor “are privileged and may not be disclosed . . . without a court
order,” it was improper for his pre-sentence report to include juve592
The court noted that the statute contains excepnile records.
tions; for example, a minor’s records must be disclosed “to any federal, state, or municipal law enforcement agency when those
records are pertinent to a ‘specific investigation being conducted by
593
that agency.’”
In James v. State,594 the court of appeals held that a defendant
validly invoked his Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination and had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to be required to discuss the details surrounding charges of which he was
595
James was on probation for convictions of sexual
convicted.
abuse of a minor in the second degree and second-degree sexual
596
assault. He was required, as a condition of his probation, to par597
ticipate in sex offender treatment during his incarceration. While
the denial of James’ application for post-conviction relief was on
appeal, James’ probation officer attempted to revoke his probation

586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.

Id. at 895.
Id.
75 P.3d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1073-74.
Id.
Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.310(b)(1) (Michie 2003)).
75 P.3d 1065 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
Id.
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because he failed to participate in the sex offender therapy pro598
gram. James invoked the Fifth Amendment, declining to discuss
599
the charges in therapy because his case was on appeal. The Office of the Attorney General declared that the privilege against
self-incrimination did not excuse James from participating in the
600
therapy. The court of appeals held that James did have a Fifth
Amendment right to refuse to discuss the charges of which he was
601
convicted. Due to James’ collateral attack on his conviction, he
demonstrated a valid reason to believe that his compelled state602
His Fifth Amendment right
ments might incriminate him.
trumped the state’s interest in enforcing a condition of his proba603
tion. Therefore, his probation could not be revoked when he re604
fused to discuss the charges.
605
In Jones v. State, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s
admission, if given after an officer’s guarantee that the conversa606
Jones was arrested for
tion is “off the record,” is involuntary.
607
multiple counts of sexual assault and abuse of a minor. Officers
questioned Jones unsuccessfully until one of the officers agreed
608
with Jones that the conversation was “off the record.” After that
agreement, Jones admitted that he had had sex with the victim and
609
that he knew she was fourteen years old. The supreme court held
that the totality of the circumstances showed that Jones’ statements
were induced by the agreement with the officer and thus were in610
Consequently, the supreme court reversed Jones’
voluntary.
611
conviction.
In Larson v. State,612 the court of appeals held that the admissibility of jurors’ affidavits as evidence turned on the type of impro613
priety alleged of the jurors, not the timing of that impropriety.
Larson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1072.
65 P.3d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 910.
79 P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 653.
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count of burglary, after which he petitioned for post-conviction re614
The superior
lief, alleging misconduct by the jury at his trial.
court dismissed his petition, concluding that Larson’s allegations
did not constitute a valid exception to Evidence Rule 606(b)’s pro615
On appeal,
hibition of juror affidavits as admissible evidence.
Larson argued that the juror affidavits were admissible because
they described misconduct that occurred before the jury’s formal
616
He also alleged that the jurors’ misconduct dedeliberations.
prived them of their status as jurors under Rule 606(b) and that the
alleged misconduct was so egregious that it constituted an obstruc617
tion of justice and a denial of due process. The court of appeals
618
affirmed the holding of the superior court, reasoning that Rule
606(b) applied to Larson’s allegations of juror misconduct even
though the misconduct occurred before the jury commenced for619
mal deliberations. The court further held that jurors who engage
620
in misconduct do not forfeit their status as jurors and that Rule
621
606(b) did not violate Larson’s constitutional rights.
622
In Magee v. State, the court of appeals held that a contingent
search warrant was unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the triggering
event was not defined precisely enough to ensure judicial control
623
over the search process. When police were attempting to investigate a possible methamphetamine laboratory at Donald Wares’
residence, they applied for a “contingent” warrant to search
624
Magee’s property. The proposed warrant allowed for a search of
Magee’s property upon the finding of any evidence of illegal drug
625
activity at Wares’ residence. In allowing such anticipatory war626
rants, the triggering event must be strictly and precisely defined,
627
in order to prevent “premature” execution of the warrant. Such
warrants must be drawn such that the judicial officer’s “role in de-

614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 652-53.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 659.
Id.
77 P.3d 732 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
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tecting the occurring of [the triggering] event is essentially ministe628
Because the warrant here did not clearly define the trigrial.”
629
gering event, it was unconstitutional. The police were given too
630
much discretion, rendering the warrant unlawful.
631
In McGee v. State, the court of appeals held that the police
do not have reasonable suspicion to remove a package from the
normal stream of commerce if the State does not present evidence
632
On
explaining why the package was singled out for removal.
January 11, 1999, a policeman intercepted a suspicious package addressed to McGee at a Federal Express facility, tested it, and dis633
covered traces of a controlled substance on it. The officer then
obtained a search warrant, opened the package, and found seven
634
ounces of cocaine inside. Convicted at his first trial, McGee then
appealed and won a remand and a reversal in a trial court. The
635
State then appealled McGee’s second trial. The State explained
that the policeman intercepted the package because he thought
that the name “Sam McGee” was comical and likely fictitious, the
double-wrapping of the package looked suspicious, and, among
other things, the airbill, addressed by hand, had no phone number
636
on it. The trial judge, however, concluded that the police’s reasons to find this package suspicious were not sufficient to give the
637
police reasonable suspicion to test the package. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s reversal of McGee’s earlier conviction, holding that the record provided no evidence “to support a ra638
tional inference that the package contained contraband.”
639
In McGuire v. State, the court of appeals held that cocaine
640
found during a pat-down for weapons was admissible. A police
officer responded to a fight outside of a bar and patted down sev641
eral people for weapons. When McGuire was patted down, the
police officer felt a plastic bag and rectangular corners of a con-

628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.

Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
70 P.3d 429 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 432.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 430-31.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 432.
70 P.3d 1114 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1115.
Id.
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tainer traditionally used to carry narcotics.642 The police officer was
643
“absolutely certain” that McGuire possessed narcotics. McGuire
stated that it was marijuana, so the officer seized what was later
644
At trial, McGuire moved to suppress the
found to be cocaine.
cocaine, arguing that the search exceeded the permissible scope of
645
a pat-down for weapons. The State argued that the search was
646
permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine. The State then filed
a notice of supplementary authority citing Minnesota v. Dicker647
son, a United States Supreme Court case endorsing the plain feel
648
The superior court denied McGuire’s motion to supdoctrine.
649
press. The superior court also denied a second motion asking the
court to reconsider on the grounds that Dickerson had not been
650
On appeal, the
made known to McGuire prior to the hearing.
court of appeals affirmed the decision to admit the cocaine as evi651
dence. The court stated that McGuire’s admission that he pos652
The court
sessed a narcotic justified the police officer’s search.
also upheld the denial of the motion to reconsider because Dickerson had been decided more than five years before the hearing, and
the State had informed the defendant that it would rely on the
653
Thus, the decision to deny reconsideration
plain feel doctrine.
was not an abuse of discretion, and the decision of the superior
654
court was affirmed.
In Nelson v. State,655 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to dismiss an entire jury panel after one juror was dismissed during the selection
656
process after admitting her distrust of the defense attorney.
During jury selection for Nelson’s trial, a juror stated that she had a
657
The juror ex“very strong opinion” of the defense attorney.
plained that she felt the defense attorney distorted the facts in a
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1115.
508 U.S. 366 (1993).
McGuire, 70 P.3d at 1115.
Id.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
68 P.3d 402 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 403.
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previous trial for which she had been a juror.658 The juror was dis659
missed. Nelson then moved to dismiss the entire panel, arguing
660
The
that it was “tainted” by the dismissed juror’s comments.
661
The supreme court upheld this
court denied Nelson’s motion.
decision, stating that the entire panel was not prejudiced by the
662
comments, and the defense could have easily objected. The superior court’s provision of a limiting instruction was held to be an ap663
propriate control on any prejudice.
664
In Perrin v. State, the court of appeals overruled the trial
court’s decision to bar a defendant’s defense testimony on the rea665
soning of Gerlach v. State, which precludes a necessity defense in
666
custodial interference cases. The court of appeals held that, even
if the trial court was concerned that the defendant would claim necessity without meeting the requirements of the affirmative defense, it could have instructed the jury that the defendant would
have to utilize obtainable legal remedies before assuming unlawful
667
self-help. After he left the state for approximately three months
with his daughter without notifying the child’s mother, who had
primary physical custody of the child, Perrin was indicted for cus668
todial interference. To obtain a custodial interference conviction,
the State had to prove that the defendant was a relative of the
child, and, knowing that he had no right to do so, took or kept the
child from his or her lawful custodian with the intent to withhold
669
the child for a protracted period. At trial, Perrin intended to introduce evidence that he took his daughter out of state because he
feared his daughter was being abused by her mother’s compan670
ion. The trial court concluded that self-help was not an acceptable defense for custodial interference because to allow self-help in
to demonstrate lack of intent essentially established the necessity
671
defense. Barring Perrin’s testimony denying he had the requisite

658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id.
66 P.3d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Perrin, 66 P.3d at 25.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
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intent to withhold his daughter for a protracted period both relieved the State of its burden of proof as to that element of the
crime and deprived Perrin of his constitutional right to testify in his
672
own behalf. For these reasons, the court of appeals reversed Per673
rin’s conviction.
In Phillips v. State,674 the court of appeals held that a defendant
had not been unfairly convicted of murder, escape, robbery, assault, and vehicle theft, but remanded the case for re-sentencing,
675
finding that the murder sentence was in error. Phillips committed
676
a series of crimes the day after being released from prison. Phillips stole a cab in his escape attempt following commission of an
armed robbery, and, on later being discovered and pursued by a
police officer, engaged in a struggle with the officer that led to the
677
officer’s death. On appeal, Phillips argued that his trial had been
678
The court
unfair and that his resulting sentence was excessive.
held that evidence of crimes that Phillips committed at the beginning of the sequence of events did not improperly prejudice the
679
jury’s findings on later crimes. The court of appeals further held
that, although the presence of a number of uniformed officers at
the beginning of the trial may have affected the jury, the lower
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Phillips’ requests for a
mistrial or for a complete ban on the officers’ presence in the
680
courtroom. Addressing another claim that the trial had been unfair, the court of appeals held that although the introduction of the
deceased officer’s widow to the jury may have been erroneous, it
681
Finally, reviewing Phillips’
did not prejudice the proceeding.
challenge that his sentence was excessive, the court of appeals held
682
that the lower court had incorrectly applied Gustafson v. State in
683
its determination of the sentence for second-degree murder. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case
684
for re-sentencing.
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Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
70 P.3d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id. at 1130-31.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1140.
854 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
Phillips, 70 P.3d at 1145.
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In Porterfield v. State,685 the court of appeals upheld the admission to evidence of recorded statements made to a third party by a
criminal defendant’s wife implicating her and her husband’s in686
Todd Porterfield was
volvement in the commission of a crime.
convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree arson based on
recordings of statements made by his wife Michele to a third
687
party. Todd argued that the lower court abused its discretion because Michele’s statements were inadmissible as statements against
688
interest, and such admission violated his confrontation rights.
The court of appeals held that the statements by Michele were admissible under Evidence Rule 804(b)(3) because, in the context of
all her statements, her admission “tended to subject her to criminal
liability” as an accomplice, and “a reasonable person in [her] position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
689
true.” The court of appeals further held that Todd’s confrontation rights were not violated because nothing in the circumstances
of the statements indicated why Michele would falsely implicate
herself, and the third party offering the testimony was subject to
690
cross-examination at trial.
691
In Register v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
692
court’s denial of defendants’ motions to withdraw their pleas.
The defendants were indicted for first-degree assault in connection
with a stabbing, but were allowed to plead no contest to second693
The victim sued the defendants in civil court.694
degree assault.
As a result of their no contest plea, the defendants were estopped
695
The defenfrom contesting that they had assaulted the victim.
dants moved to withdraw their no contest pleas, but the superior
696
The defendants asserted that they
court denied their motions.
had entered their pleas under a mistaken understanding that their
697
pleas could not be used against them in civil litigation. The record indicated conflicting testimony regarding whether or not the
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68 P.3d 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
71 P.3d 337 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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Id.
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defendants’ attorneys had informed them that their no contest
698
pleas could be used against them in civil litigation. The superior
court decided that the testimony of the attorneys that they had
699
properly informed their clients was more credible. Additionally,
the superior court was unconvinced that the threat of civil liability
would be enough to make the defendants reject the “rather lenient
700
deal” offered to them in the plea arrangement. The court of ap701
peals found that these conclusions were not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the denial of the defendants’ motions to withdraw
702
their pleas was affirmed.
703
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals held that a nonappearing witness’ statements must be separated into inculpatory
and non-inculpatory segments, and only the inculpatory segments
of the testimony are admissible under the “declarations against in704
Smith was convicted of
terest” exception to the hearsay rule.
murder, robbery, and assault, based on an alleged incident in which
Smith and an accomplice invaded the trailer of a man and four
705
Zachary Brown had made statements to his girlfriend
friends.
that Smith and his accomplice had borrowed his shotgun and re706
When the gun was returned,
turned the gun with blood on it.
707
Brown removed the gun’s handle and cleaned off the blood. At
trial, Brown’s statements were admitted as statements against interest, which are allowed under the hearsay rule if the statements
are against the declarant’s interests or may submit him to criminal
708
or civil liability. Brown exercised his Fifth Amendment right not
to testify and thus incriminate himself based on his cleaning of the
709
gun. In holding that admission of Brown’s entire statement constituted reversible error, the court of appeals held that a court must
evaluate a declarant’s statements and sever the non-inculpatory
710
Brown’s statements were only admissible under the
portion.
hearsay exception (and thus did not violate the Confrontation

698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.

Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
81 P.3d 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 308.
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Clause of the federal and Alaska State constitutions) if they were
711
The
“reliable” (i.e., firmly rooted in a hearsay rule exception).
court held that Brown’s statements were not sufficiently reliable to
be admitted without violating Smith’s right to cross-examine
712
Smith’s convictions were therefore reBrown under oath.
713
versed.
In Sproates v. State,714 the court of appeals held that a criminal
defendant was entitled to be released from custody when no preliminary examination was held and the State presented no evidence
715
Sproates, a criminal
that the defendant committed an offense.
defendant charged with first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, was
denied a preliminary examination as to whether he should remain
716
in custody because he had already been indicted by a grand jury.
The State argued that the district court can refuse to schedule a
preliminary examination so long as the decision is made within ten
717
days of the defendant’s initial appearance. The court of appeals
held that Sproates was unlawfully detained and therefore entitled
718
to release.
In State v. Jack,719 the court of appeals held that Alaska Statutes section 44.03.010 does not grant Alaska criminal jurisdiction
720
over Canadian territorial waters. Jack was indicted by an Alaskan grand jury for committing sexual assault aboard an Alaskan
721
ferry traveling through Canadian territorial waters. The superior
court dismissed the case, holding that Alaska did not have jurisdic722
tion. The State appealed, arguing that section 44.03.010 granted
723
it jurisdiction over the incident. The statute provides that Alaska
jurisdiction extends to “water offshore from the coast of the state,”
including “the marginal sea” and “the high seas to the extent
724
claimed by the United States” or recognized by international law.
The court of appeals held that the “marginal sea” does not include

711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 320.
81 P.3d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
67 P.3d 673 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 677.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 675.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.03.010 (Michie 2002).
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Canadian territorial waters, and thus Alaska did not have jurisdic725
tion under this clause. The State argued that “high seas” should
be interpreted to include “all the ocean offshore of Alaska up to
726
the low-water mark of all countries.” The court rejected this interpretation of the statute, finding it overly broad and beyond the
727
“water offshore” contemplated by the statute. Instead, the court
held that even if the United States possessed jurisdiction over
crimes committed in foreign waters, Alaska jurisdiction did not
728
necessarily extend this far. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
729
decision of the superior court in favor of the defendant.
730
In State v. Simpson, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s prior convictions for driving while intoxicated are admissible, even if those convictions occurred in other states where inde731
pendent chemical tests are not available. Simpson was charged
732
with felony driving while intoxicated. Though such an offense is
normally a misdemeanor, it can be elevated to felony status with
733
evidence of prior similar convictions. The right of a defendant to
an independent blood alcohol level test is protected by due process
734
in Alaska. Though guarded, the right to this independent test is
not absolute and does not merit the same protection as the right to
735
counsel or right to a jury trial. Further, practical considerations
limit the extent of this right, in that situations which make such a
test impractical or exceedingly burdensome can justify its omis736
sion. Here, because the prior convictions were only challenged
on the basis that the other states did not provide an independent
test, they could be admitted to elevate the current charge from
737
misdemeanor to felony.
738
In State v. Wagar, the supreme court held that “an officer
conducting a pat-down search for weapons during an investigatory
stop who feels an object that he reasonably believes might be used

725.
726.
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.

Jack, 67 P.3d at 676.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id.
73 P.3d 596 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600.
79 P.3d 644 (Alaska 2003).
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as a weapon may examine the object to confirm that it is not a po739
tential weapon.” During a sting operation, a police officer frisked
Wagar and, upon feeling an unidentifiable object, discovered a
740
glass vial containing cocaine. At trial, the judge denied Wagar’s
motion to suppress the cocaine seized by the officer on grounds
741
The
that his search was unjustified, and Wagar was convicted.
court of appeals reversed Wagar’s conviction on the grounds that
the police officer “exceeded the allowable scope of a pat-down
search for weapons when [he] looked into [the defendant’s] t-shirt
742
pocket in order to determine what the unknown object was.”
The court of appeals also required specific facts to show that the
743
officer’s suspicion was reasonable. The supreme court reversed
the court of appeals, affirming Wagar’s convictions by refining the
744
test for determining whether a further examination is justified.
The court held: “[W]hat is needed to justify a further examination
of an unknown object felt in a frisk for weapons is a reasonable belief on the part of the officer, based on ‘specific and articulable
facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’
745
that the object may be used as a weapon.”
746
In Stavenjord v. State, the court of appeals held that the superior court had not abused its discretion in denying the defen747
dant’s motions to suppress evidence and change venue. Staven748
jord was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial.
Stavenjord appealed, claiming that the superior court should have
granted his motion to suppress certain evidence, which he claimed
had been acquired using search warrants that should not have been
749
In deciding Stavenjord’s motion, the superior court apissued.
750
plied the test outlined in State v. Malkin. After finding that certain misstatements or omissions had been made in the application
for the search warrants, the superior court found that none had
751
been an intentional attempt to mislead the court. Identifying cer-

739.
740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.

Id. at 645.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 646-47.
Id.
See id. at 648.
Id.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
66 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).
Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 766.
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tain misstatements or omissions that may have been reckless, the
superior court found that none of these had been material to the
decision to grant the warrant, and thus the court denied Staven752
jord’s motion. The court of appeals found that the superior court
753
had not abused its discretion in making this decision. Stavenjord
also appealed the superior court’s denial of his motion to change
venue, claiming that pre-trial publicity may have prejudiced the
754
jury. The court of appeals found that the lower court could have
reasonably concluded, under the “substantial likelihood” test out755
lined in Mallot v. State, that the pretrial publicity did not threaten
756
The court of appeals thus afStavenjord’s right to a fair trial.
757
firmed the superior court’s decision.
In Strumsky v. State,758 the court of appeals held that a tenyear-old’s out of court statements to others indicating that she had
been sexually abused by the defendant were not hearsay and that
the defendant had not been barred from putting his own admission
759
in context. Strumsky was accused of sexually abusing a ten-year760
old girl in October 2000. Before trial, Strumsky told the girl’s fa761
ther that the girl would never lie. At trial, the prosecution was
allowed, over Strumsky’s objections, to call witnesses who had
762
The prosecution also
heard the victim describe her assault.
played a tape that showed Strumsky saying about the victim, “No,
763
she doesn’t lie.” Strumsky appealed, arguing that the witnesses
who heard the victim describe her assault should have been prevented from testifying because their testimony was inadmissible
764
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
hearsay.
explaining that the trial judge properly concluded that the evidence
had sufficient probative value as prior-consistent-statement evidence from a child sexual abuse victim to outweigh its prejudicial
765
impact. Strumsky also argued that he was entitled to play the en-

752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
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762.
763.
764.
765.

Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 764.
608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980).
Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 770.
Id.
69 P.3d 499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 504.
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tire tape to put his comments about the victim’s truthfulness into
766
context without having testified. The court of appeals held that
the trial judge gave Strumsky an opportunity to have the tape
played in full when he testified; since Strumsky did not ask to have
767
the tape played then, he did not preserve this issue for appeal.
768
In Thompson v. State, the court of appeals held that where
criminal defendants are held jointly and severally liable for restitution to an assault victim, a single defendant’s ability to pay should
769
be judged by the entire amount due to the victim. Thompson and
three accomplices were convicted of assault, and were held jointly
770
Thompson arand severally liable for restitution to the victim.
gued that he would be unable to pay the entire restitution amount,
and asked for a reduction of the amount under Alaska Statutes
771
The superior court held
12.55.045(f), given his inability to pay.
that Thompson had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he would be unable to pay his one-fourth share of the
772
The court of appeals vacated the superior
restitution amount.
court’s restitution order, holding that Thompson’s ability to pay
773
must be judged against the entire restitution amount. The court
held that on remand Thompson could be held jointly and severally
liable only if the superior court set a payment schedule based on
Thompson’s foreseen ability to pay, or if the court found that
Thompson failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
774
was unable to pay the full restitution amount.
775
In Tipikin v. Municipality of Anchorage, the court of appeals
held that a composite long sentence for a defendant with both a
776
conviction for assault and a history of violence was justified. Tipikin was convicted of assault for slapping his step-daughter and of
disorderly conduct for fighting with his wife, and was sentenced to
777
730 days in prison. Tipikin argued that there was insufficient evi778
dence for his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. The

766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
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775.
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Id. at 505.
Id.
64 P.3d 132 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id.
65 P.3d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 900.
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court of appeals held first that there was sufficient evidence for Tipikin’s conviction, determining that he slapped his step-daughter
out of anger and not because it was “reasonably necessary and ap779
The court of appeals then held that the composite
propriate.”
sentence was not excessive because of Tipikin’s history of domestic
violence, his conduct in committing the current offenses, and his
780
repeated failures to rehabilitate himself.
781
In Tuttle v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial court
applied the incorrect standard of proof on the issue of whether a
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a robbery
782
for purposes of determining his presumptive term. At trial, Tuttle was found guilty of robbery, and at sentencing the court announced that it applied the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof in deciding that Tuttle carried a firearm during the
783
robbery. Thus, Tuttle was sentenced to a seven year presumptive
term, rather than a five year presumptive term, under Alaska Stat784
utes section 12.55.125(c). The court of appeals reversed, finding
that the trial judge erred in applying this standard. While the legislature had specified the “beyond the reasonable doubt” standard
for proving a defendant’s prior felonies, the legislature had not
specified the appropriate burden of proof when the presumptive
term determination rests on other factors, such as the defendant’s
785
786
possession of a firearm during the offense. In Huf v. State, the
court reasoned that the legislature must have intended the reason787
able doubt standard to apply to these other situations. Therefore,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
788
defendant possessed a firearm during the robbery.
789
In Vaska v. State, the court of appeals held that a sexual
abuse victim’s statements identifying her attacker are admissible
hearsay even if the victim does not remember the events at the
790
time of the trial. At defendant Vaska’s sexual abuse trial, the victim testified that she could not remember the alleged assault, nor
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Id. at 902.
Id.
65 P.3d 884 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 891.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
675 P.2d 268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Tuttle, 65 P.3d at 888.
Id. at 891.
74 P.3d 225 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 230.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

2004]

05/18/04 2:19 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

175

anything else that had happened more than a year earlier.791 However, testimony from the victim’s mother and the doctor who examined the victim immediately after the alleged assault supported
792
the allegations against Vaska. Vaska appealed his conviction on
the grounds that allowing the statements of the mother and doctor
793
was an erroneous admission of hearsay and that the admission
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
794
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals held that the statements were hearsay, yet were properly ad795
The court also held
missible as prior inconsistent statements.
that, because the Confrontation Clause only requires that the ac796
cused be allowed to confront and cross-examine the declarant,
not necessarily the original speaker, Vaska’s right to confrontation
797
was not violated. Therefore, the court affirmed Vaska’s convic798
tion.
In Waters v. State,799 the court of appeals held that the defendant’s confession was voluntary, that the prior conviction of a state
witness was not admissible, and that a defendant’s sentence was not
800
Waters participated in the robbery of a community
excessive.
store and was convicted of second-degree burglary, second-degree
801
theft, and second-degree criminal mischief. The court of appeals
first upheld the superior court’s ruling that Waters’ confession was
voluntary, in part because Waters’ cell was heated, Waters slept the
night before the confession, and Waters, not the officer, introduced
802
the option for a deal. Second, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s decision not to admit evidence that the State’s witness had a criminal conviction ten years ago, noting that the record
803
did not show that the evidence was required for a fair trial.
Third, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s enhance-
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Id. at 226.
Id. at 226-27.
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ment of Waters’ sentence because the superior court’s findings
804
showed that Waters was a threat to public.
805
In Watt v. State, the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s decision that a criminal defendant’s challenge to remove a
806
superior court judge was untimely. Watt was charged with first807
Watt appeared before Judge
degree sexual abuse of a minor.
Bolger and reached a plea agreement with the prosecution in which
he would waive indictment and plead guilty in superior court to
808
two counts of sexual abuse for a limited sentence. On August 30,
2002, Watt filed a request to preempt Judge Bolger in further superior court proceedings under Criminal Rule 25(d), which provides
peremptory disqualification procedures within five days after a
809
Judge Bolger denied the chaljudge is first assigned to a case.
lenge as untimely because he was first assigned to the case on July
810
7. Alaska Statutes section 22.20.022 grants a party the substantive right to disqualify a judge peremptorily; a party must exercise
that right “within five days after the case is at issue upon a question
of fact, or within five days after the issue is assigned to a judge,
811
The court of appeals held that,
whichever event occurs later.”
under the statute, an issue is under a question of fact when jurisdiction of the case is transferred to the superior court for a defen812
Therefore, Watt’s
dant’s plea upon return of the indictment.
challenge was timely and his right to a peremptory challenge upon
813
entry of a plea in superior court was not extinguished.
814
In Wilson v. State, the court of appeals held that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant a court-ordered search of the ap815
Wilson appealed the district court’s authorizapellant’s home.
tion of a warrant leading to the seizure of marijuana, claiming that
the evidence presented in the search warrant application did not
816
The evidence provided by the State
establish probable cause.
comprised of statements from three individuals, two of whom were
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Id. at 175.
61 P.3d 446 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 2002).
Watt, 61 P.3d at 447.
Id. at 448.
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Id. at 787.
Id. at 783.
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known informants while the third was an unknown friend of one of
817
the informants. The court noted that the State’s one credible informant had no first-hand knowledge of the appellant’s allegedly
818
Instead, that informant was simply relaying
criminal activities.
information he received from a friend whose identity he would not
819
disclose. The court refused to treat the unidentified friend as a
credible informant because he did not know that his statements
820
were against his penal interest. Therefore, the court reversed the
district court’s granting of a search warrant and deemed the evi821
dence seized thereunder suppressed.
822
In Winfrey v. State, the court of appeals held that the district
court did not err in including as evidence the results of a breath test
after state troopers interfered with a defendant’s right to make a
phone call, or in excluding as evidence a decision by the troopers to
823
Winfrey was arstop videotaping breath-testing procedures.
rested for driving while intoxicated after failing two sobriety tests
824
and a breathalyzer test. During his trial, Winfrey argued that the
district court erred when it included the results of the breathalyzer
test because state troopers had violated Winfrey’s right to make a
825
phone call under Alaska Statutes section 12.25.150(b). The court
of appeals rejected this argument, holding that Winfrey failed to
prove that the denial of his right to make a phone call interfered
826
Winfrey furwith his constitutional right to prepare a defense.
ther argued that the district court erred when it excluded evidence
that the state troopers had made a policy decision to stop videotaping subjects during breath-test processing because such video827
The
tapes made it harder to prosecute alleged drunk drivers.
court of appeals held that such evidence was relevant but that the
828
exclusion was harmless in this case.
829
In Young v. State, the court of appeals held that the police
had illegally searched a defendant’s property, where the police had
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no search warrant and the defendant’s conduct constituted an attempt to conceal, rather than an actual abandonment of, the prop830
erty. While investigating an unconnected disturbance at a hotel,
a police officer observed Young shoved a small object underneath
831
a locked closet door. The officer subsequently removed the object from under the door, and, upon discovering it to be a bundle of
crumbled tissue paper, opened the tissue to discover an illegal con832
trolled substance. The court of appeals first noted it was likely
the officer did not have authority to reach under the door and seize
833
Young’s property, as the officer did not first have probable cause.
Moreover, the officer had no authority to open the tissue bundle
without a warrant, unless the officer knew that the bundles were
“distinctive, single-purpose containers used for carrying illicit
834
drugs.” The court of appeals rejected the State’s contention that
issues of search and seizure were irrelevant, as Young had “aban835
The court noted that abandonment redoned” the property.
quires that a person’s conduct objectively manifest the intent to
836
give up any and all expectation of privacy in that property. Neither a person’s temporary relinquishment of possession or control
of an object nor a person’s actions to conceal the property suffi837
ciently demonstrates abandonment. Here, Young’s placement of
the bundles under the door indicated an intent to conceal rather
838
Further, Young’s denial of his having
than to abandon them.
placed any object under the door was not equivalent to an express
839
denial of ownership, as required for abandonment. Therefore, as
the property had been illegally opened, the court ordered the evi840
dence suppressed and Young’s conviction reversed.
B. Substantive Law
841
In Alto v. State, the court of appeals held that an individual
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity could be convicted of
escape for fleeing the custody of the psychiatric institute to which
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.

Id. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1251.
64 P.3d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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the individual had been committed.842 Alto was found not guilty of
murder by reason of insanity and was committed to the Alaska
843
The
Psychiatric Institute, from which he successfully escaped.
court of appeals held that Alto could properly be convicted of es844
cape under Alaska Statutes section 11.56.310(a)(1)(B). The court
found that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity contains
within it the finding that the defendant had actually committed the
845
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, as Alto’s detention
was clearly connected with the commission of a felony offense,
Alto had removed himself from “official detention for a felony” as
846
Additionally, the
required under section 11.56.310(a)(1)(B).
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s jury instructions, finding that Alto had waived any objection to a stipulation voluntarily
847
entered into at trial and that the State did not need to prove Alto
848
was aware that the offense resulting in his detention was a felony.
Finally, the court held that Alto’s sentence of six years was not excessive, because the murder for which he was found not guilty by
reason of insanity was properly considered an aggravating factor
849
for sentencing.
In Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System v. Gallion,850 the
supreme court upheld a finding of indirect criminal contempt
against the Board of Trustees of the Anchorage Police & Fire Re851
tirement System (“Board”). In 2000, the superior court approved
both a class action settlement with regard to the use of surplus fund
852
monies and an award of attorney’s fees to class counsel. Due to
criticisms of the award of attorney’s fees, the court explicitly explained its reasons for rejecting objections and the calculation of
853
fees. Furthermore, the court ordered the Board to send a written
copy of the court’s oral order to all members when it distributed
854
the funds. The court subsequently found the Board in criminal
contempt due to its actions in resisting the court order and its three
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week delay in distributing the order after funds were paid.855 The
supreme court upheld this ruling based on a finding that failure to
follow the trial court’s unambiguous order was sufficient for a
856
showing of a willful failure to comply. Moreover, the court found
that despite the absence of an explicit analysis of the reasonable
doubt standard of proof as applied to the facts of the case, the trial
857
court ruling should be affirmed.
858
In Bertilson v. State, the court of appeals held that the State,
in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, must prove a defendant is either impaired or has the prohibited blood alcohol level at
the time the vehicle was being operated by or under the control of
859
the defendant. After being alerted by a phone call describing a
possible drunk driver, the police stopped Bertilson and adminis860
tered typical field sobriety tests. Bertilson was convicted of fel861
ony driving while intoxicated. The court of appeals reversed Bertilson’s conviction, as it was based on incorrect jury instructions
that improperly asserted that Bertilson’s guilt hinged on the test results and not on his actual blood alcohol level at the time he was
862
The court held that under Alaska Statutes section
driving.
28.35.030(a)(2), an individual’s guilt for driving while intoxicated
must hinge on the blood alcohol content at the time of operating or
863
controlling the vehicle. Therefore, the court reversed Bertilson’s
864
conviction.
In Brandon v. State,865 the supreme court held that a prison disciplinary hearing conducted by a single hearing officer is not a vio866
Brandon, a prison inlation of a prisoner’s due process rights.
mate, was charged with violating an administrative regulation
867
against possession of tobacco. A disciplinary hearing was held by
a single officer, after which Brandon was found guilty and sen868
tenced to punitive segregation. Brandon argued that the hearing
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857.
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859.
860.
861.
862.
863.
864.
865.
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867.
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Id. at 879.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 884.
64 P.3d 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 186.
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violated his due process rights because a single hearing officer can869
The court found
not guarantee fair and impartial adjudication.
no violation of due process under the principle that single hearing
officers are not presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary pro870
Brandon further argued that the disciplinary hearing
ceedings.
871
violated the final settlement agreement of Cleary v. Smith, a
class-action settlement governing numerous aspects of prison conditions in Alaska. The court held that Brandon’s hearing was not
872
prejudiced by any violation of that agreement.
873
In Cruz-Reyes v. State, the court of appeals held that the
elements of theft of services are satisfied if the alleged thief has
874
mere access to the services, even if he did not use them. Alaska
State Troopers found an electronic device in Cruz-Reyes’ residence
that allowed him to view premium cable channels even though he
875
only paid for standard service. At trial, the judge instructed the
jury that, to find Cruz-Reyes guilty of third-degree theft of services,
it would have only to find that he had access to the extra channels
876
and not that he had actually used them. Because a subscriber’s
fee depends on the channels available to him, not the channels he
actually watches, the court held that the jury instruction was correct and that the evidence was sufficient to convict Cruz-Reyes
even though it only showed that he had access to the premium
877
Therefore, the
channels, not that he actually watched them.
878
court affirmed Cruz-Reyes’ conviction.
In Dailey v. State,879 the court of appeals held that a defendant
is required to sign quarterly reports under the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act (“SORA”) and that the statute is not unconstitu880
Daily was a convicted sex offender and as such
tionally vague.
881
Neverthewas required under SORA to file quarterly reports.
less, Dailey refused to sign three such reports and he was convicted
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870.
871.
872.
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874.
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877.
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Id. at 1235.
Id.
24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2003).
Brandon, 73 P.3d at 1248.
74 P.3d 219 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 225.
65 P.3d 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 893.
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of criminal offenses for non-compliance.882 Daily claimed that the
charges should be dismissed because failure to sign the reports did
not constitute a criminal offense and because the statute was un883
constitutionally vague. The court of appeals affirmed the convic884
The court held that Alaska Statutes section 12.63.010 retion.
quires that the quarterly reports be signed, and that the statue was
885
not unconstitutionally vague.
886
In Dandova v. State, the court of appeals found that the defendant was not entitled to a “heat of passion” defense for the attempted murder of her former lover, because on the day of the
shooting the victim had not provoked the defendant sufficiently to
887
create a serious provocation to cause such a violent response.
Dandova attempted to kill her former lover by shooting him and
was consequently indicted for attempted murder and first degree
888
During her trial, Dandova asked to have the jury inassault.
structed on a defense of heat of passion, which is codified in Alaska
889
The trial judge denied
Statutes sections 11.41.115(a) and (f).
890
Dandova’s request. Under the Alaska statute, a defendant must
have acted in the heat of passion, resulting from serious provocation, when there had not been reasonably sufficient time for the
891
passion to cool. On appeal, the court first stated that the defense
of heat of passion is available for those indicted of attempted mur892
However, the court also found that the Alaska statute, in
der.
codifying the common law, does not extend the heat of passion defense to “extreme emotional disturbance”; instead it uses a more
893
restrictive “heat of passion” methodology. Under this more restrictive process, the court found that the events that had provoked
Dandova had occurred too far in the past, thus allowing a reason894
able person time to cool. Furthermore ,the court found that the
alleged provoking actions immediately preceding the crime were

882.
883.
884.
885.
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887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.
893.
894.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 895.
72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 326-27.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a)(1) (Michie 2002).
Dandova, 72 P.3d at 332.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
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not directed toward the defendant; therefore, they did not count as
895
provocation under the statute.
896
In J.R. v. State, the court of appeals held that a juvenile who
induces another juvenile to commit homicide with a firearm should
897
Evan Ramsey
not be judged by an adult standard of care.
brought a shotgun to his high school and murdered the principal
898
J.R., who taught Ramsey how to use the
and a fellow student.
gun and encouraged Ramsey to carry out his plan, was convicted
on two counts of murder on the theory that “J.R. had knowingly
engaged in conduct manifesting an extreme indifference to the
899
value of human life.” The state argued that because J.R. was involved in an adult activity, the use of a firearm, he should be held
900
to an adult standard of care in determining his recklessness. The
court rejected the State’s argument because J.R. did not actually
901
use the firearm, but instead incited another to do so. The court
therefore reversed J.R.’s convictions, holding that J.R. could not be
held to an adult standard of care based on his conversations and actions showing Ramsey how to use the shotgun, because doing so
would effectuate a broad usage of the adult standard of care in ju902
venile cases.
In Lee v. Municipality of Anchorage,903 the court of appeals
held that under Alaska Municipal Code section 8.65.060, the Municipality must show that a defendant knowingly maintained
premises on which prostitution occurred and that the defendant in904
tended for such prostitution to occur on such premises. Lee was
charged with “knowingly maintain[ing] or operat[ing] a place,
building, structure or part thereof, . . . for the purpose of prostitu905
The trial judge applied only the “knowingly” mental
tion. . . .”
state, and Lee was convicted, despite Lee’s argument that the ordi906
nance has two mental states, “knowingly” and “intentionally.”
On appeal, Lee claimed that the language “for the purpose of” required specific intent and that the Municipality had to prove two

895.
896.
897.
898.
899.
900.
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902.
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904.
905.
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Id. at 338-39.
62 P.3d 114 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 115 (citing Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999)).
See id. at 119.
Id.
70 P.3d 1110 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1111.
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elements: (1) that she knowingly operated a place of prostitution;
907
and (2) that she intended prostitution to occur in the place. The
908
The court noted
court of appeals reversed, agreeing with Lee.
that federal courts have held, when interpreting statutory language,
that knowledge and intent are two separate mental elements, with
909
purpose denoting intent. Reasoning that, under the Model Penal
Code and majority views of accomplice liability, an alleged accomplice would have to “seek by [her] action to make it succeed,” thus
requiring a showing of intent, the court of appeals concluded that
the trial judge erred in applying only the “knowingly” standard in
910
Lee’s case.
In Morton v. State,911 the court of appeals held that a criminal
defendant cannot be convicted of possession of burglary tools
912
merely for possessing ordinary tools that have not been adapted.
Morton was convicted of several crimes, including possession of
burglary tools under Alaska Statutes section 11.46.315, for posses913
Since the
sion of an ordinary screwdriver and rubber mallet.
tools had not been adapted or designed for use in committing a
burglary, they did not qualify as “burglary tools” under section
11.46.315; therefore, the prosecution confessed error and the court
914
of appeals vacated the conviction.
915
In Olson v. State, the court of appeals reversed an inmate’s
conviction for violation of a long-term domestic violence protective
order, holding that because he had never received notice of the
hearing for the petition for a protective order, his conviction was
916
void. Olson was convicted of violating a long-term domestic violence protective order by coming within three hundred feet of
917
Larry Jackson’s residence. The court agreed with Olson that under Alaska Statutes section 18.66.100, which governs long-term
domestic violence protective orders and requires notice and an op918
Olson was
portunity to be heard, Olson’s conviction was void.
not required to obey the protective order despite being aware of its
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910.
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912.
913.
914.
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917.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1112-13.
68 P.3d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
77 P.3d 15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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terms, because a person need not comply with an order that issued
919
ex parte if that person had no notice before the order was issued.
Finally, the court stated that the statutory language regarding requirements for issuing long-term domestic violence orders should
have alerted Olson’s attorney that any order issued without notice
920
would be void. The court concluded that Olson’s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the
921
lack of jurisdiction to issue the order.
In Parrott v. Municipality of Anchorage,922 the court of appeals
held that a prospective customer can be prosecuted for prostitu923
Parrott was convicted of soliciting prostitution, after, action.
cording to him, an undercover police officer initially approached
924
his vehicle. The evidence that Parrott invited the officer into his
vehicle for oral sex sufficiently supported the finding that Parrott
925
did in fact “solicit” prostitution as the applicable statute requires.
Though Parrott attempted to raise defenses of entrapment, due
process violation and equal protection, none of these were consid926
ered because they were raised too late. Lastly, the court held that
the sentence imposed, including a fine and required essay, was appropriate to effect rehabilitation and did not impose upon a right
927
against self-incrimination.
928
In State v. Combs, the court of appeals reversed a superior
court ruling that upheld a supplemental order barring the Department of Corrections from housing a defendant in the same correctional facility as another inmate who had previously assaulted
929
him. Upon conviction for attempted first-degree assault and the
approval of Combs’ motion for special housing, the Department of
Law challenged the order, arguing that the Department of Correc930
tions had sole discretion in determining where to house prisoners.
Despite the fact that there was no mandate regarding which particular facility Combs was to be housed in, the court of appeals
found that the separation of powers would be violated were the ju-

919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
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928.
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Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
69 P.3d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
64 P.3d 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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dicial branch permitted to interfere in a determination over which
931
the Department of Corrections had sole executive discretion.
Further, the court found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did
not preclude a challenge to the superior court’s order because the
Department of Corrections was not in privity with the prosecutor’s
932
office when he assented to Combs’ original motion.
933
In State v. Strane, the supreme court held that the Alaska
statute criminalizing violations of domestic violence restraining or934
ders did not require proof of the defendant’s actual knowledge
935
Rather, the statute required the
that his actions were illegal.
State to show only that the defendant knew of the order’s existence
and contents and recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifi936
Police stopped
able risk that his conduct violated such order.
Strane for speeding and discovered a domestic violence victim in
his car, two weeks after the victim obtained an order restraining
937
Strane from having any contact with her. Strane attempted to defend by stating that the victim had consented to be in his pres938
The supreme court held that a restraining order’s noence.
contact restrictions apply regardless of the protected person’s con939
sent to have contact. The court rejected the interpretation that
the statute’s culpable mental state of “knowingly” extended in
scope to require that Strane must understand that the order prohibited his actions, citing a sister provision to the statute which expressly provided that the protected person’s willingness to have
940
contact with the defendant did not nullify or waive the order.
Further, Strane’s order warned that any invitation to contact the
941
victim would not invalidate the order.
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
In Alaska State Employees Ass’n v. State,942 the supreme court
held that an arbitrator’s ruling that a public employee’s termination
was not for just cause could be vacated on appeal if it was deter931.
932.
933.
934.
935.
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 140.
61 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2003).
ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.740(a) (Michie 2002).
Strane, 61 P.3d at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1285, 1286.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
74 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2003).
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mined that the arbitrator made an obvious and significant mistake
in applying the facts of the case to the arbitrator’s own definition of
943
An administrative clerk of the Alaska Child Sup“just cause.”
port Enforcement Division was fired after her employer learned
944
that she had recently pled guilty to felony theft of public money.
The Alaska State Employees Association filed a grievance seeking
945
reinstatement of the clerk. Per a collective bargaining agreement
between the state and the employer, the dispute was submitted to
an arbitrator, who ruled that the clerk was not terminated for just
946
cause, and ordered that the grievance be reinstated. Upholding
the vacation of the arbitrator’s award, the supreme court held that
the arbitrator committed gross error in applying her own definition
947
of just cause. The court refused to decide whether the arbitrator
was obligated to follow state law precedent on the definition of just
cause, as suggested by the superior court decision, and instead held
that the arbitrator committed gross error under her own definition
948
of just cause. Given the clerk’s position of trust, access to confidential information, and conviction of a felony, the court held that
substantial evidence existed to show just cause for the employee’s
949
termination.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. DeShong,950 the supreme
court held that if an employee presents clear and convincing evidence that she has not reached medical stability, then she is eligible
for Temporary Total Disability (“TTD”), provided that she reim951
burses any unemployment benefits received during that time.
Further, an employee does not waive “procedural rights to seek
952
Decompensation” unless she is fully appraised of her rights.
Shong, an employee of Alyeska, alleged that job-related computer
use resulted in right elbow joint pain and filed a report of occupational injury or illness with the Alaska Workers Compensation
953
Board (“Board”). DeShong consulted a doctor, who prescribed
954
Further, this doctor had her evaluated by a
physical therapy.
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hand surgeon, who found her to have reached “medical stability.”955
In December 1998, DeShong was laid off by Alyeska.956 In August
1999, DeShong received a second opinion, without Alyeska’s per957
mission. Alyeska alleged that DeShong was not entitled to a second opinion without its approval, further arguing that she had al958
The second doctor recommended
ready seen a specialist.
959
surgery, which was later successfully performed. After being laid
off, DeShong was paid unemployment benefits, but later received
960
TTD benefits after the surgery. In July 1999, De Shong filed for
TTD from the time of being laid off through that date, and stated
961
Alyeska
that she wanted to repay the unemployment benefits.
denied this request, stating that she was ineligible for TTD, as she
962
had reached medical stability. However, the Board found otherwise, and held that if she repaid the unemployment benefits, she
963
would be eligible for TTD. On appeal, the supreme court held
that DeShong produced clear and convincing evidence that she had
not attained medical stability before surgery, thus entitling her to
964
TTD. Further, the court held that Alyeska’s referral of DeShong
to a specialist did not constitute a second opinion, and that any delay in her seeking such opinion was a result of her not being clearly
965
informed of her rights. Lastly, the court held that an employee is
not barred from receiving TTD if she repays any unemployment
966
benefits she received in the interim.
In Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow,967 the supreme court
held that an employer was obligated to pay workers’ compensation
payments for all treatments provided after a plan was submitted, as
968
well as treatments made within fourteen days of submission.
Baker-Withrow was injured while working for Crawford in 1990,
and after eight years of psychotherapy, she began Eye Movement
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Id. at 1229-30.
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Id.
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Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy.969 Crawford refused to
pay for this therapy, claiming that a treatment plan had not been
970
Such a treatment plan is outlined under
submitted punctually.
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.095(c), requiring a health care provider to notify the employer regarding the treatment within four971
Based on the statute’s purpose,
teen days following treatment.
the court held that a plan submitted more than fourteen days after
treatment may bar coverage for any treatment received before the
submission, and that such a policy is consistent with the statutory
972
purpose. However, the court also held that it would be too severe to ban coverage for all post-plan treatment due to untimely
973
submission of a plan. The only treatments that should be banned
for late submission are those past treatments deemed to be overly
974
frequent. Therefore, the court held that since the employer submitted a plan as soon as it realized the need, treatments received
after and within fourteen days of submission were the responsibility of the employer, and the specific date of submission was to be
975
determined on remand.
In Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp.,976 the supreme court held that an
employer’s claim for reimbursement of benefits based on fraud was
subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, and
977
that such a standard was constitutional. Unocal alleged in a controversion notice to the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board
(“Board”) that its employee, Denuptiis, had falsely exaggerated
978
claims of injury in order to obtain disability pay. Unocal argued
that because the Alaska statutes imposing civil and criminal liability for false statements made in connection with worker’s compen979
sation cases did not specify a standard of proof, the Board should
apply a preponderance standard, as opposed to a higher clear and
980
981
convincing standard. The Administrative Procedure Act, which
applies to the Board, calls for a default preponderance standard in
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971.
972.
973.
974.
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Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(c) (Michie 2000).
Crawford, 73 P.3d at 1229.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 275.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.250(a), (b), 23.30.170(b) (Michie 2002).
Denuptiis, 63 P.3d at 275.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.460(e) (Michie 2002).
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the absence of an expressly provided standard.982 The court held
that, because no standard of proof exists, the Board’s application of
a clear and convincing standard was not a reasonable interpretation
983
of the governing law.
In Duncan v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc.,984 the
supreme court held that the Alaska constitutional protection for
state employee accrued benefits encompassed health insurance but
that, unlike other retirement benefits which are contractual rights,
health insurance policy changes should be analyzed with regard to
advantages and disadvantages by focusing on the entire group of
985
Retirees filed suit against the State alleging that
employees.
changes made to the group health insurance plan for retired public
employees violated Article XII, section seven of the Alaska Consti986
The trial court granted
tution by diminishing accrued benefits.
the retiree’s motion for summary judgment and held that the
987
On appeal, the suchanges violated the Alaska Constitution.
preme court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment decision
in favor of the retirees based on the holding that health insurance
988
Both Alaska
benefits were protected by the State constitution.
case law and the plain-meaning rule suggested that Article XII, section seven’s “accrued benefits” should be broadly defined to in989
The suclude benefits provided by state retirement systems.
preme court reversed the lower court’s summary judgment decision
in favor of the retirees, however, insofar as it held that the comparative analysis of disadvantages and compensating advantages of
health insurance policy changes was to focus on individuals rather
990
than on the entire group of retirees.
In Robinson v. Municipality of Anchorage,991 the supreme
court held that in workers’ compensation cases, the claiming party
must establish such claims by a preponderance of the evidence
once the employer has rebutted the presumption that the injuries
992
Robinson, a bus
are work-related with substantial evidence.
driver for the Municipality of Anchorage, filed an application with
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the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) for medical
expenses and “time loss” arising out of on-the-job accidents in 1992
993
and 1995. Robinson was also injured in an auto accident in 1993,
994
which led to a settlement in his favor for $47,000. Anchorage argued that Robinson had failed to establish that the work-related
995
injuries were a substantial factor in his ongoing back problems.
In affirming the superior court’s ruling that the Board properly rejected Robinson’s claim, the supreme court applied the three-part
presumption analysis it established in Temple v. Denali Princess
996
Lodge. First, the employee must establish a link between the injury and the employment, which creates a rebuttable presumption
997
in favor of the employee. Second, the employer may rebut this
presumption with substantial evidence that provides either an alternative explanation for the injury or eliminates any reasonable
998
possibility that the injury was work-related. Third, once the presumption has been rebutted, the employee can prevail only if his
999
claims are proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing the Board’s decision to determine whether there was substantial evidence for it, the court held that in the case of both injuries,
the Municipality had successfully rebutted the presumption of validity, and that Robinson had failed to overcome the presumption
1000
Under a “clear error” stanby a preponderance of the evidence.
dard, the court also held that the Board did not err in denying
1001
Robinson’s motion for reconsideration of his claims.
In University of Alaska v. Alaska Community Colleges Federa1002
tion of Teachers, the supreme court held that the arbitrator erred
in finding a violation of a collective bargaining agreement’s nondiscrimination clause when there was no evidence of illegal discrimi1003
Pursuant to a commissioned study’s findings regarding
nation.
underpaid employees, the University of Alaska authorized a pay
adjustment for non-union workers to remedy salary disparities be1004
In response, the union
tween union and non-union employees.
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Id.
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filed a grievance alleging that the university violated its collective
bargaining agreement’s non-discrimination clause by failing to in1005
clude union members in the study and resulting salary increases.
After arbitration and subsequent appeal, the university was ordered to undertake a separate but similar study of union faculty
1006
and apply the pay increase to correct any identified inequalities.
The supreme court, in finding error, left open the question of the
appropriate standard of review for compulsory arbitration decisions, holding that even the more deferential “gross error” stan1007
dard was met. Violation of the agreement depended on a finding
of discrimination as prohibited by law; however, differing treatment based on union membership was not prohibited by law absent
1008
Because the arbitrator found no such
any anti-union animus.
animus or discrimination in the university’s acts, it was gross error
1009
to find a violation of the nondiscrimination clause.
In Witt v. State, Department of Corrections,1010 the supreme
court held that making a public employee’s permanent employment contingent on a probationary period does not transform the
employment contract from an at-will contract into one in which
1011
Witt was
the employee can only be dismissed for good cause.
hired by the Department of Corrections in the summer of 1998 and
1012
A collective bargaining agreement
put on six months’ probation.
between the Alaska Public Employees Association, of which Witt
was a member, and the Department of Corrections, restricted the
state’s ability to contract with private vendors if such a contract
1013
The day folwould lead to layoffs of Department employees.
lowing Witt’s last day of work, the Department accepted a bid for
services from an outside contractor to perform some of the func1014
The supreme
tions that Witt had fulfilled for the Department.
court affirmed summary judgment for the Department, holding
that because Witt’s contract of employment did not explicitly require performance evaluations, Witt was an at-will employee dur1015
The court further held that
ing the initial probationary period.
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Witt failed to present material facts to establish that the Department had violated the covenants of good faith and fair dealing in
1016
The court therefore affirmed the superior court’s
hiring him.
grant of summary judgment, holding that Witt had failed to raise
1017
any genuine issues of material fact.
VIII. FAMILY LAW
In In re Adoption of L.E.K.M.,1018 the supreme court held that
the grant of primary physical and legal custody of an orphan to
friends of the child’s mother and not to her biological grandparents
1019
Lucy M. was orphaned at three
or aunt and uncle was proper.
1020
Friends of
months of age when her mother was shot and killed.
Lucy’s mother, Elsa and Dillon C., took custody of her and pro1021
Lucy’s family members on
ceeded to file a petition for adoption.
cross-petition for adoption argued that Alaska Statutes section
47.14.100(e)(1), which prohibits foster placement when relatives
1022
The court
are willing to take custody of a child, should apply.
found that Alaska Statutes section 25.23.120(d), which provides
that adoption procedures need only look to what is in the best interests of the child and give no preference to blood-relatives, was
1023
As such, the court
the only appropriate and applicable statute.
reviewed several criteria and found that there had been no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in determining that Elsa and Dillon C.
should be awarded full custody and that Lucy’s relatives should be
given continued visitation rights.
1024
In A.J. v. State, the supreme court held that it was appropriate for the superior court to take all of a parent’s past conduct into
account when determining whether children have been subjected
to conduct or conditions warranting the termination of parental
1025
Ann Jackson’s
rights under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011.
parental rights over her daughters were terminated on the dual
bases of her history of substance abuse and her failure to protect
1026
Jackson claimed that the supeher children from sexual abuse.
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.

Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1037.
70 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id. at 1101.
Id.
62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 611.
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rior court should not have relied on events prior to the termination
proceedings in making a determination under section
1027
47.10.011(a)(1) and that termination of parental rights should
1028
rest upon a determination that the children are in need of aid.
The court held that consideration of a mother’s past conduct is ap1029
propriate and adequate in terminating parental rights.
1030
In Bailey v. Bailey, the supreme court held that the superior
court’s calculations of arrearages and the prospective support obli1031
Raymond Bailey appealed the
gation were clearly erroneous.
superior court’s order excusing Charmaine Bailey from paying
1032
Raymond argued that the superior
child support arrearages.
court should not have retroactively modified Charmaine’s child
1033
The supreme court disagreed, stating that
support obligation.
the structure of the original order provided for discretion in future
1034
Raymond also argued that the sucalculations of child support.
perior court’s calculation of Charmaine’s arrearage was clearly er1035
The supreme court agreed, pointing out mathematical
roneous.
1036
Lastly,
and factual errors in the superior court’s calculation.
Raymond argued that the superior court failed to consider evi1037
dence of his earnings in calculating his prospective obligation.
1038
The supreme court agreed that this was erroneous.
Accordingly,
the supreme court vacated the superior court’s order regarding
these calculations and remanded for appropriate findings and re1039
calculation of the amount due.
1040
In Connor v. Connor, the supreme court held that retirement benefits must be separated from disability benefits in a di1041
vorce proceeding. Jerry Connor contested the lower court’s divi1042
sion of assets in his divorce from Margaret. The court reasoned
that retirement benefits are earned during the marriage, thus be1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.
1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
Id.
63 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
68 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1234.
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coming marital property, while disability benefits are regarded as
1043
the separate property of the spouse. The court also held that
these retirement benefits could be considered mature on Jerry’s fif1044
tieth birthday, because the United States Code holds the age of
1045
This
fifty to be one way to reach retirement benefit eligibility.
calculation has been found to protect the nonemployee spouse
1046
Furthermore, the court held that rehabilitative supadequately.
port, given to assist a spouse in acquiring employable skills, may be
1047
appropriate in this proceeding.
1048
In Corbin v. Corbin, the supreme court addressed the issue
of the calculation of child support when some of the children are
1049
The parties in this action had
being cared for by third parties.
three children; upon separating, the two oldest children were cared
for by their grandparents and the youngest child was jointly cared
1050
The father appealed a calculation
for by the mother and father.
by the trial court that both parents owed child support based on a
1051
The
fifty-fifty shared custody agreement for all three children.
supreme court found that the trial court’s calculation of support
1052
Civil
based on shared custody of all three children was incorrect.
Rule 90.3(i)(2) directs the court to “calculate the support obligation without consideration of the third party custodian or any chil1053
Therefore, the
dren in the custody of the third party custodian.”
trial court should have used the shared custody method for one
1054
The supreme court reversed the
child found in Rule 90.3(i)(2).
trial court’s calculations and remanded the case with directions to
1055
follow the new calculations.
1056
In Duffus v. Duffus, the supreme court held that a party
must object to a master’s calculation of child support at trial in or1057
The court further held
der to preserve the argument for appeal.

1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.

Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236.
5 U.S.C. § 8412(e) (2002).
Connor, 68 P.3d at 1237.
Id.
68 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id. at 1271.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1274.
72 P.3d 313 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 319.
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that the prohibition of retroactive modification of child support
awards under Civil Rule 90.3(h) does not apply when no “final
1058
Juliann Duffus divorced Kenchild support award” yet exists.
neth Duffus in 1990 but did not file a motion to establish child sup1059
The standing master calculated the amount
port until 1999.
owed by Kenneth for back child support for 1990 and recommended that this amount should apply to all intervening years until
1999, when Juliann’s motion was filed, in order to comply with
1060
Juliann did not object to the trial court’s 1990 calRule 90.3(h).
culation, but did object to freezing that amount for all payments
1061
The supreme court held that under Civil Rule
owed until 1999.
53(d)(2), Juliann’s failure to object to the master’s 1990 calculation
1062
However,
at trial precluded her from raising the issue on appeal.
the supreme court found that the superior court did err in its appli1063
Because no final child support award was
cation of Rule 90.3(h).
entered until 1999, calculations of amounts owed before that date
did not qualify as prohibited “retroactive modifications” of an
1064
award.
In Erica A. v. DFYS,1065 the supreme court upheld the lower
court’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights to her
two children under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088, finding that
1066
In May 2000,
the superior court had committed no clear error.
DFYS filed a petition to terminate Erica A.’s parental rights with
1067
DFYS had a
regard to her two children, Kevin and Amy.
lengthy and well-documented history assisting Erica A., who was
first reported to it in 1989 for the abuse and neglect of previous
1068
The suchildren and later for mistreatment of Kevin and Amy.
preme court ruled that for a court to terminate parental rights, it
must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent had
failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy conditions that placed a
1069
A court must also find by a preponderance of the
child at risk.
evidence that DFYS had made reasonable efforts to assist and re-

1058.
1059.
1060.
1061.
1062.
1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
Id.
66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2-5.
Id. at 6.
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unite the family but that termination of parental rights was subse1070
The supreme court apquently in the children’s best interests.
plied a “clearly erroneous” standard of review to the superior
court’s findings regarding the DFYS’s reasonable efforts and the
best interests of the children and found that no error had oc1071
1072
curred. Accordingly, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.
1073
In Ford v. Ford, the supreme court held that the results of a
divorce mediation session were binding on a plaintiff because he
1074
participated meaningfully and was not ill during the session.
Both parties were represented by counsel and the parties recorded
a settlement at the conclusion of the mediation session, without the
1075
In this settlement, the plaintiff
presence of court personnel.
1076
Upon the
agreed to vacate his marina by December 21, 2000.
plaintiff’s failure to vacate the marina, the defendant moved to en1077
The plaintiff opposed this moforce the settlement agreement.
tion, arguing that he was not aware that the settlement agreement
was binding and that had he been in good health, he would have
1078
The superior court
“vigorously opposed” the sale of the marina.
1079
concluded that the mediation had produced a binding settlement.
The supreme court affirmed the enforcement of the settlement
agreement for two reasons. First, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that his illness prevented him from meaningfully participat1080
Second, although the mediator did not ask
ing in the mediation.
the parties whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily, the
court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that he was unaware that the
1081
mediation constituted a binding agreement.
1082
In G.C. v. DFYS, the supreme court held that due to evidence of child abandonment, there were sufficient grounds to ter1083
Gary Carson never saw, had
minate the father’s parental rights.
contact with, or supported his ten-year-old son Daniel, and upon

1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 11.
68 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1266.
67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 655.
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his incarceration in Colorado, DFYS filed a petition to terminate
1084
First, the court affirmed the superior court’s
his parental rights.
determination that the child had been abandoned and was in need
under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011(1), based on clear and
convincing evidence that Carson’s actions demonstrated a willful
1085
Second, the court afdisregard of his parental responsibility.
firmed the finding that DFYS had made reasonable efforts to re1086
Due
unify Gary and Daniel to prevent out-of-home placement.
to Carson’s incarceration, reasonable efforts were limited to contacting the Colorado Department of Corrections and requesting
1087
Acthat any available classes and services be provided to him.
cordingly, statutory requirements for parental rights termination
1088
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision that
were satisfied.
it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Carson’s paren1089
tal rights.
In Gurney v. Franks,1090 the supreme court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion when it ordered that property
obtained during a voided marriage should be divided equally be1091
Here, the wife had been married
tween the husband and wife.
previously and did not know whether that marriage had been dis1092
The trial court
solved before she married her new husband.
therefore held the new marriage void and moved on to the issue of
1093
The trial court ruled that the property obdivision of property.
tained during the “cohabitation” should be divided equally between the husband and wife because it perceived that their intent
1094
The trial court
had been to share ownership of such property.
1095
The supreme
did not find that the wife had committed fraud.
court held that the trial court’s refusal to find fraud was not clearly
erroneous and thus that the division of property in this manner was
1096
not an abuse of the court’s discretion.

1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.

Id. at 650.
Id. at 651-52.
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie 2002)).
Id.
80 P.3d 223 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.
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In Harrower v. Harrower,1097 the supreme court held that the
required elements of the theory of transmutation or the theory of
appreciation must be individually demonstrated in order to show
that a spouse’s separately owned property had become marital
1098
During divorce proceedings, Delores Harrower
property.
claimed that stock separately acquired by her husband, James Har1099
The superior court found for
rower, was marital property.
Delores, holding that the stock was marital property in its en1100
The supreme court, however, held that the superior
tirety.
court’s finding was in error, because the lower court failed to address whether the necessary elements of either transmutation or active appreciation were met, improperly blurring the two separate
1101
The record did not support a finding that transmutatheories.
tion had occurred because there was no evidence of intent to
transmute the stock or evidence of significant managerial involve1102
However, the court found that the record
ment by both spouses.
may support active appreciation and remanded for further pro1103
In so doing, the supreme court explicitly adopted the
ceedings.
majority rule that the spouse in opposition to the finding of active
appreciation bears the burden of showing an absence of causation,
while the spouse in favor of active appreciation retains the burden
1104
of showing marital contribution and appreciation.
1105
In Hixson v. Sarkesian, the supreme court held that a modification of child support in response to a reduction in the parent’s
income, when the reduced income remained above the specified
cap amount, should be calculated according to the terms of the existing settlement agreement, rather than the income cap under
1106
Hixson and Sarkesian divorced and subseCivil Rule 90.3.
1107
quently entered into a settlement agreement. Several years later,
Sarkesian filed a motion to modify the child support payments
1108
The superior court found
based upon a decline in his income.
that Sarkesian’s decrease in income exceeded the fifteen percent

1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.

71 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 858-60.
Id. at 858-59.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 859.
66 P.3d 753 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 756.
Id.
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requirement under Rule 90.3(h)(1); consequently, the court im1109
On apposed the $84,000 income cap specified under the Rule.
peal, the supreme court held that the modification of child support
should not have been based on the income cap, but rather on the
1110
Speterms of Hixson’s and Sarkesian’s settlement agreement.
cifically, the court held that when an existing settlement agreement
waived the income cap and provided for child support above the
Rule’s requirement, a fifteen percent change in income does not
1111
As Sarkenecessarily result in imposition of the income cap.
sian’s reduced income remained above the cap, the fact that the in1112
The court remanded
come was close to the cap was irrelevant.
for determination of child support based on Sarkesian’s actual re1113
duced income, rather than the income cap.
1114
In In re Adoption of Bernard A., the supreme court held
that in weighing the interests of an adopted child, it is not an abuse
of discretion for a lower court to weigh the length that the adoptee
1115
Bernard
was with foster parents more heavily than other factors.
A., an Indian child, was born in 1999 and was quickly thereafter
removed from the care of his biological parents and placed with
1116
Both Bernard’s grandparents and his parents
two foster parents.
1117
A Special Master refiled petitions to adopt Bernard in 2001.
ported that it would be in Bernard’s best interests for his foster
parents legally to adopt Bernard, based on their parenting skills
and the fact that Bernard had been with them between ages seven
1118
In affirming the lower court’s adoption
months and three years.
of the Special Master’s recommendation, the supreme court held
that the lower court gave proper weight to the amount of time that
1119
While one factor may
Bernard had spent with his foster parents.
not outweigh all others in a “best-interests” analysis, a court may
choose within its discretion to give more weight to certain fac1120
tors.

1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.
1120.

Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.

YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC

2004]

05/18/04 2:19 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

201

In In re Adoption of Keith M.W.,1121 the supreme court affirmed the adoption of an Indian child by non-Indian parents, as
the biological Indian mother’s consent to the adoption constituted
good cause to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act’s
1122
Andrea, a member of the
(“ICWA”) placement preferences.
Native Village of Napaimute, initially agreed to the adoption of her
1123
However, beson, Keith, by the Wilsons, a non-Indian family.
fore the adoption was finalized, Andrea withdrew consent, but then
1124
subsequently reaffirmed her consent for the adoption to occur.
In affirming the lower court’s decree of adoption, the supreme
court found that Andrea’s consent, ultimately reaffirmed after an
initial change of mind, along with the open nature of the adoption
and the already established bond between the child and the adoptive parents, constituted good cause to deviate from ICWA’s
1125
placement preferences for Indian parents.
1126
In Inman v. Inman, the supreme court held that a court may
relieve a party from a final divorce judgment that is void and hold a
1127
Homer Inman filed for
new trial to equitably divide the estate.
divorce from Peggy Inman in November 1982, and a default di1128
In September
vorce decree was entered in Peggy’s absence.
1999, Peggy filed a motion seeking partition of Homer’s retirement
1129
The court upheld the
benefits, which the trial court granted.
1130
judgment, reasoning that the 1982 divorce decree was void for
want of personal jurisdiction and therefore Peggy may be relieved
1131
The court further
from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4).
held that the trial court did not err in holding a new trial in order to
1132
Despite the delay in filing Peggy’s
equitably divide the estate.
motion for relief, the court held that the trial court did not err in
1133
denying Homer’s laches defense as a matter of equity.

1121.
1122.
1123.
1124.
1125.
1126.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.

79 P.3d 623 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 630-32.
67 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658-59.
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In Jack C. v. DFYS,1134 the supreme court upheld the lower
court’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights to his
two children, finding that the return of the children would place
1135
Jack C. was reported to DFYS for sexual
them at risk of harm.
1136
abuse of his two daughters in 1999 and was incarcerated for such
1137
In November 2001, DFYS filed a petition for
behavior in 2001.
1138
The superior court
termination of Jack C.’s parental rights.
ruled for the state, and Jack C. appealed, claiming that DFYS had
not proven by “clear and convincing evidence” that he had failed to
remedy the conduct placing his children at risk within a reasonable
1139
The supreme
time under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088.
court considered the lower court’s findings that Jack C. had failed
to complete any of the programs proposed by DFYS and remained
1140
Applying a “clearly erroneous” stan“essentially untreated.”
dard of review, the supreme court ruled that the superior court had
not clearly erred in ruling that Jack C. had failed to remedy his
1141
Accordingly, the
conduct or in terminating his parental rights.
1142
lower court’s decision was affirmed.
In Koller v. Reft,1143 the supreme court vacated the trial court’s
determination of a prospective child support award when the father’s obligation was based on past earnings and not his current in1144
Unable to establish an amicable relationship with Reft,
come.
his child’s mother, for visitation, Koller sought primary custody of
1145
He initially filed a child support guidelines affidavit
his son.
which reflected his earnings as a physician in New Mexico, al1146
The court
though he was living in Alaska and underemployed.
granted joint custody and ordered Koller to pay $1,000 per month
1147
Koller apin child support, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.
pealed on grounds that the court lacked sufficient evidence to
make the child support obligation determination and that the court

1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.
1139.
1140.
1141.
1142.
1143.
1144.
1145.
1146.
1147.

68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1278-79.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
71 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
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erred in awarding costs and fees to Reft.1148 The court struck down
the child support award for lack of the evidentiary support required by Civil Rule 90.3(c), given Koller’s changed employment
1149
The matter was remanded for consideration of
circumstances.
additional evidence concerning local job availability, earnings of
similarly situated doctors, and Koller’s historical and actual earn1150
Because the issues so closely resembled a divorce case, the
ings.
court upheld the fees and costs award to Reft, which was based on
the relative economic situations and earning powers of both par1151
ties.
In Martin v. State,1152 the supreme court upheld a superior court
ruling that an incarcerated father’s parental rights were properly
1153
Petitioner
terminated under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088.
1154
A
Martin was incarcerated for attacking the mother of his child.
superior court eventually ruled that Martin’s parental rights to his
1155
The supreme court reviewed the
daughter should be terminated.
decision and stated that it would only overrule the superior court’s
1156
The supreme court held
findings if they were clearly erroneous.
that: (1) Martin put the child in substantial risk of physical harm;
(2) Martin did not make sufficient progress in controlling his anger;
(3) the state made reasonable efforts to provide support services to
Martin; and (4) the termination of Martin’s rights were in the
1157
In particular, the supreme court stated that
child’s best interest.
Martin’s violent behavior did not have to be directed at the child to
be considered and that the superior court’s consideration of placement with one of Martin’s relatives was irrelevant to the termina1158
tion proceedings.
In McElroy v. Kennedy,1159 the supreme court held that a nonbiological father’s second action seeking to vacate a Child Support
Enforcement Division (“CSED”) order to recover such previously
paid child support was barred according to the principle of res judi-

1148.
1149.
1150.
1151.
1152.
1153.
1154.
1155.
1156.
1157.
1158.
1159.

Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 809-10.
79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 53-56.
Id. at 54, 57.
74 P.3d 903 (Alaska 2003).
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cata.1160 When Kennedy found that he was not the biological father
of McElroy’s son, he attempted to terminate his legal obligations
for support and obtain reimbursement for those monies previously
1161
The trial court legally terminated Kennedy’s future paterpaid.
nity and custody obligations, but refused to grant reimbursement
from McElroy or to set aside a CSED order, dismissing Kennedy’s
1162
Subsequently, Kennedy instituted a secaction with prejudice.
ond action to vacate the CSED order and gain restitution of all
1163
Res judicata bars subsechild support monies previously paid.
quent claims when “the prior judgment was: (1) a final judgment
on the merits; (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction; [and] (3)
in a dispute between the same parties (or their privies) about the
1164
Therefore, the court found that Kensame cause of action.”
1165
nedy’s second claim for restitution was barred from litigation.
1166
In O’Connell v. Christenson, the supreme court held that the
trial court’s failure to make specific findings justifying its determination to impute income to a father rendered the question of
1167
O’Connell appealed a
whether the trial court erred impossible.
court order that imputed income to him and thereby modified his
1168
child support obligation to Christenson. Relying upon Civil Rule
90.3, the trial court imputed an income of $43,550.13 to O’Connell,
1169
despite his claim that his adjusted annual income was $8,185.38.
Civil Rule 90.3 permits a trial court to calculate child support on a
determination of the potential income of a parent who voluntarily
1170
This deand unreasonably is unemployed or underemployed.
termination should be based upon the parent’s work history, quali1171
The supreme court stated that
fications, and job opportunities.
the trial court has a duty to enter findings adequate for rational ap1172
The court
pellate review when it sets a child support obligation.
then determined that the trial court did not provide any rationale

1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.
1166.
1167.
1168.
1169.
1170.
1171.
1172.

Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 909.
75 P.3d 1037 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
O’Connell, 75 P.3d at 1039.
Id. at 1040.
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for its decision as to the amount of imputed income.1173 Since the
trial court did not provide any rationale for imputing income, the
supreme court could not effectively determine whether the trial
court had erred; therefore, the supreme court vacated the child
1174
support award and remanded the question of imputed income.
1175
In Richard B. v. State, the supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in allowing a law firm to represent a
child’s mother at trial, even though the same firm had represented
1176
The law firm reprethe child’s father in an earlier criminal trial.
1177
The same firm
sented Richard in a sexual assault case in 2000.
represented Leslie, the mother of Richard’s children, when the
State successfully petitioned to terminate Leslie’s and Richard’s
1178
The supreme court remanded the case, holding
parental rights.
that the court must determine if Richard was adversely affected by
the firm’s representations of Leslie because the firm was conflicted
1179
and Leslie’s interests were adverse to Richard’s.
1180
In Riddell v. Edwards, the supreme court held that, despite a
finding that Riddell had “ingratiated himself” to the deceased with
an underlying motive to attain her assets, it was inequitable for the
superior court to establish a constructive trust and deprive Riddell
of his statutory rights to marital property on mere moral
1181
grounds. The court held that athough the deceased had suffered
from Alzheimer’s-related dementia, was physically isolated and
abused by Riddell, and had snuck away to marry him secretly,
these facts were legally insufficient for a post-mortem claim to in1182
Because Ridvalidate the marriage on grounds of gross fraud.
dell’s unconscionable conduct neither invalidated the marriage nor
proximately caused the statutory benefits of the marriage to vest,
the supreme court held that the superior court’s establishment of a
1183
Moreoconstructive trust did not vest in proper legal grounds.
ver, the supreme court found that upholding the establishment of a
constructive trust would be inequitable on the grounds that it

1173.
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.

Id. at 1041.
Id.
71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 833.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 818-21, 824.
76 P.3d 847 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 849.
Id. at 849, 851.
See id. at 855.
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“would impermissibly expand the court’s equitable powers at the
1184
expense of established positive law.”
1185
In Sherry R. v. DFYS, the supreme court upheld a termination of parental rights because Sherry R. continued to place her
children at substantial risk of harm by failing to remedy her con1186
Sherry R. had a
duct or the conditions under which they lived.
long history of choosing abusive partners, succumbing to substance
abuse, and demonstrating an inability to comply with substance
1187
The trial court agreed with DFYS
abuse treatment programs.
that Sherry R.’s children had not only suffered developmental disorders as a result of their mother’s detrimental behavior, but that
they would be placed at substantial risk of experiencing further
emotional or physical harm if they were permitted to remain in
1188
The supreme court affirmed, basing its deSherry R.’s custody.
cision on the facts that: (1) a mere one year period of sobriety was
insufficient to prove that substance abuse was no longer a problem;
(2) the continued romantic involvement with an individual convicted of child sexual assault demonstrated poor judgment; and (3)
there existed evidence that Sherry was unable to care for her chil1189
The court upheld the trial court’s determidren’s special needs.
nation that Sherry R. had failed to change her lifestyle within a rea1190
sonable period of time.
In Smith v. Weekley,1191 the court held that a decision regarding
child custody was presumptuous and that the lower court improp1192
Sierly relied on just one factor in its placement determination.
vers and Weekley split custody of their child, Dalton, in Anchorage
1193
for most of his life. After Sivers decided to move to Wasilla,
1194
Before receiving a reply
Weekley filed for permanent custody.
from Sivers, the superior court judge granted Weekley interim custody, which was affirmed a month later after an evidentiary hear1195
Because the later
ing, and again five months later after trial.
findings were based on “stability” that developed in Dalton’s living

1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.
1192.
1193.
1194.
1195.

Id.
74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 898-01.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 903.
73 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
Id. at 1221-22.
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arrangement with Weekley after the superior court judge’s decision, and Sivers never had a chance to reply to the original complaint, the supreme court found error in the use of “stability” act1196
ing as a driving factor. The supreme court held that the relevant
statutory factors should have also been considered to determine
1197
Therefore, the court remanded the
the best interest of the child.
1198
case for a new determination on Dalton’s custody.
1199
In Teseniar v. Spicer, the supreme court held that a court
must follow Civil Rule 90.3 when setting the amount of child support owed by a defendant and that the court cannot, except in spe1200
cial circumstances, retroactively modify a child support order.
Spicer had moved to modify the child support agreement she had
1201
The superior court
with Teseniar concerning their two children.
granted the increase basing the new calculation on Teseniar’s child
1202
support obligations for two children from a previous marriage.
In addition, the court awarded retroactive child support for a pe1203
The supreme court reriod before Spicer had filed her motion.
versed the superior court’s modification of child support because
the superior court had abused its discretion when it did not follow
1204
The supreme court noted
Rule 90.3 in calculating the increase.
that it was “unlikely that Teseniar’s obligation to his two children
with Spicer would be identical to the children from his earlier mar1205
riage. . . .” In addition, the supreme court held that the change in
child support should only have been effective from the time that
1206
Spicer filed her motion.
In Vivian P. v. DFYS,1207 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not err in terminating parental rights when it determined
that the child was in need of aid and that reasonable efforts to re1208
DFYS assumed emergency
unite the family were unnecessary.
custody of a child who was hospitalized for a third time for mental

1196.
1197.
1198.
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.

Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
74 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 915.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
78 P.3d 703 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 710.
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and physical harm.1209 The mother challenged the trial court’s determination that her child was in need of aid and that DFYS made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, or in the alternative, was
1210
The supreme court held that there was
not required to do so.
clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determi1211
The court further held
nation that the child was in need of aid.
that, although DFYS did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the
family and should have sought the court’s approval before doing
so, the trial court did not err in determining that reasonable efforts
were unnecessary because of the physical and mental harm to
1212
which the child was subjected.
IX. INSURANCE LAW
In Blood v. Kenneth Murray Insurance,1213 the supreme court
found that Blood neither waived his claim to arbitration by filing
1214
suit over an insurance claim nor impliedly waived his coverage.
However, the court did find that it was proper for the trial court to
rule against Blood at summary judgment over his policy coverage,
1215
Blood was injured in an auto accident and
as an issue of fact.
1216
The insurer denied
filed a claim with his insurance company.
1217
FurtherBlood coverage, stating that his coverage had lapsed.
more, the company denied his arbitration request, claiming that
1218
Blood then sued the insurance comBlood waived the option.
pany and agent, claiming that the company was negligent in handling his policy renewal and that the coverage was not termi1219
The trial court found for the insurance company.1220 The
nated.
supreme court found that Blood did not waive arbitration because
1221
Also,
a failure to plead arbitration is not equivalent to a waiver.
Blood did not impliedly waive arbitration because such a waiver
must be direct and unequivocal enough to indicate waiver to a rea-

1209.
1210.
1211.
1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.
1220.
1221.

Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 708-10.
68 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sonable person.1222 Additionally, the court found that the district
court properly decided the issue of coverage at summary judgment,
because though a jury could find the insurer negligent in handling
the policy renewal and cancellation, this is a factual determination
1223
that a judge can make at summary judgment.
In Bradbury v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,1224 the supreme court
held that Dennis Bradbury’s wife did not die from injuries caused
by her employment, and therefore he could not collect workers’
1225
While working at Chugach, Linda
compensation for her death.
Bradbury died from a ruptured cyst in her liver that caused a fatal
1226
Her husband filed for worker’s compenanaphylactic reaction.
sation, stating that the rupture was caused by her employment activities, but was denied by the Workers’ Compensation Board,
1227
The supreme
which held that the injuries were not work-related.
court held that in order for Chugach to successfully dispute a claim
for workers’ compensation by Bradbury for his wife’s death, the
Workers’ Compensation Association must: (1) rebut the presumption for compensation with substantial evidence eliminating the
worker’s employment as a cause of injury; and (2) survive an attempt by the injured employee to prove her claim by a preponder1228
Chugach overcame this presumption both
ance of the evidence.
by providing sustainable alternative explanations for Linda Bradbury’s injury, and by presenting substantial evidence that her injuries were caused by reasons other than those given by Dennis
1229
Furthermore, Dennis Bradbury failed to prove his
Bradbury.
1230
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Coughlin v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,1231 the
supreme court held that an injured driver’s claims against the opposing driver’s insurance company will be considered exhausted
where the injured driver negotiates a settlement equal to the face
1232
Coughlin, who was invalue of the opposing driver’s coverage.
sured by GEICO for $10,000 in medical payments and $50,000 in
underinsured motorist coverage, was injured in an automobile ac-

1222.
1223.
1224.
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.
1229.
1230.
1231.
1232.

Id.
Id. at 1258.
71 P.3d 901 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905-07.
Id. at 906-08.
Id. at 909.
69 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 989.
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cident with Babosky, who had a $50,000 policy with Colonial In1233
surance. GEICO paid $10,000 of Coughlin’s medical expenses,
which created a lien for that amount against any recovery that
1234
Coughlin garnered against Babosky and Colonial. Coughlin filed
suit against Babosky, and ended up settling the action against Babosky and Colonial for $40,000 cash and responsibility for the
1235
GEICO settled its
$10,000 medical lien granted to GEICO.
$10,000 subrogated claim for Coughlin’s medical expenses with
1236
Colonial for $5,000. Coughlin later requested that GEICO pay
the $50,000 due to her under her underinsured motorist coverage,
1237
Alaska Statutes section
and filed suit when GEICO refused.
28.20.445(e)(1) requires that a claimant exhaust the underlying
1238
policy limits before pursuing underinsured motorist benefits.
GEICO argued that Coughlin did not exhaust Babosky’s policy
limits, because the settlement of the medical lien for $5,000 meant
1239
that Colonial only paid out $45,000 of the $50,000 policy.
GEICO argued alternatively that Colonial was required to pay
costs, interest and attorney’s fees, and that because Couglin re1240
In received none of these, the policy limit was not exhausted.
versing the superior court’s grant of summary judgment, the court
dismissed both arguments and held that the limits of liability re1241
ferred to in the statute refer only to the face value of coverage.
1242
In Great Divide Insurance Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, the
supreme court upheld a jury verdict awarding compensatory damages to an insured’s assignee, but reversed an award of punitive
1243
In September 1993, Carpenter suffered serious perdamages.
manent injuries and brain damage as the result of being struck by a
1244
Subsequently, Carpenter asserted a claim to recover damtree.
ages against Dan Gowdy, joint owner of Gowdy & Sons
(“Gowdy”), for actions of his employee in negligently felling
1245
Settlement via arbitration ensued.1246 However, Great Ditrees.

1233.
1234.
1235.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.
1240.
1241.
1242.
1243.
1244.
1245.

Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 988.
ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.445(e)(1) (Michie 2002).
Coughlin, 71 P.3d at 989.
Id.
Id. at 992.
79 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
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vide disagreed as to Gowdy’s coverage and sought declaratory
judgment that it was not liable to Carpenter under Gowdy’s insur1247
A jury found against Great Divide.1248 The supreme
ance plan.
court found that the jury’s verdict was legally and factually supported in finding that the accident was covered by the policy as
1249
part of Gowdy’s business “operations” and that Great Divide
1250
Howfailed to fulfill its obligations to defend its policyholder.
ever, the court reversed an award of punitive damages based on a
finding that Great Divide was prejudiced by a lack of fair notice in
the pleadings and an abuse of discretion in instructing the jury to
1251
consider the issue.
In In re Life Insurance Co. of Alaska,1252 the supreme court
held that the “automatic approval-by-inaction rule” of Alaska
Statutes section 21.78.293(b) only applies to insurance claims that
1253
The Life Insurance
have already been approved by the receiver.
Company of Alaska (“LICA”) was involuntarily dissolved by the
State in 1994, and in 2001 Carpenter Financial filed a claim against
1254
The
the company for $500,000 for repayment of a surplus note.
Alaska Division of Insurance, which had been appointed as the receiver of LICA, denied the claim, and Carpenter Financial filed for
1255
The receiver filed a report with
reconsideration in April 2001.
the superior court on July 13, 2001, and before the court had ruled
on the issue, Carpenter Financial filed a motion for summary
1256
Carpenter Financial argued in its motion that under
judgment.
section 21.78.293(b), the claim must be automatically approved,
because the court had not ruled on the claim within 120 days after
1257
The supreme court upheld the superior
the report was filed.
court’s denial of the motion, holding that subsection (b) of the
statute only applies to claims that have already been approved by
the receiver, whereas the receiver in the present case had denied

1246.
1247.
1248.
1249.
1250.
1251.
1252.
1253.
1254.
1255.
1256.
1257.

Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 613.
76 P.3d 366 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 370.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id.
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Carpenter Financial’s claim before submitting its report to the
1258
court.
In O’Connor v. Star Insurance Co.,1259 the supreme court held
that there is no duty on licensing bond sureties to independently
1260
Star
investigate third-party claims against bonded contractors.
Insurance Co. (“Star”) issued a licensing bond to Homestead
Builders, Inc. (“Homestead”) to satisfy the state registration requirement for general contractors, which mandates the provision of
1261
The O’Connors, unhappy with Homea bond or cash deposit.
stead’s construction work on their home, sued Homestead and
1262
Subsequently, according to their indemnity agreement,
Star.
1263
The O’Connors
Star tendered defense of the suit to Homestead.
then sued Star, claiming (1) that Star, as the surety, owed them a
legal duty to fairly, fully, and impartially investigate their claim
1264
against the bond; and (2) that Star’s tendering of the defense to
Homestead, without conducting its own investigation, violated this
1265
In rejecting the O’Connors’ claim, the court
duty in bad faith.
first distinguished licensing bonds from performance and payment
1266
The
bonds, which have a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
court also noted that no such duty is statutorily imposed upon li1267
censing bond sureties. Therefore, as licensing bond sureties have
no duty to independently investigate third-party claims against
bonded contractors, the court rejected the O’Connors’ bad faith
1268
claim against Star.
In Therchik v. Grant Aviation, Inc.,1269 the supreme court held
that an insurance company’s endorsement limiting coverage of attorney’s fees not preapproved by the director of the Alaska Division of Insurance (“Division”) is unenforceable unless it is nearly
1270
identical to the model form adopted by the Division. Therchik
and four other plaintiffs sued Grant Aviation after an airplane
owned by the company crashed, killing members of the plaintiffs’

1258.
1259.
1260.
1261.
1262.
1263.
1264.
1265.
1266.
1267.
1268.
1269.
1270.

Id. at 369.
No. S-10500, 2003 Alas. LEXIS 162 (Alaska Dec. 26, 2003).
Id. at *17-18.
Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *21.
74 P.3d 191 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 196.
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families.1271 A provision of the insurance policy that Houston Casualty Company had issued to Grant Aviation made Houston Casualty potentially liable for unlimited attorney’s fees awarded in the
1272
Grant Aviation, on behalf of Houston
suit under Civil Rule 82.
Casualty, argued that a provision in the insurance policy limited its
liability, including attorney’s fees, to the facial limits of the pol1273
Therchick argued that the provision limiting attorney’s fees
icy.
was unenforceable because it did not include the exact language of
Notice A, a model form provided by the Division, and thus violated
1274
Under section
Alaska Administrative Code section 26.550.
26.550, if Houston Casualty did not obtain written approval from
the director of the Division, the policy would have to conform with
1275
The supreme court reasoned that since the alternative
Notice A.
to conforming with Notice A was preapproval by the director of
the Division, the standard for conforming with Notice A must be
1276
The court therefore reversed the supe“very close to identical.”
rior court, holding that the insurance policy did not conform with
Notice A because it altered the model form’s language in ways that
1277
were more than “minute deviations.”
X. PROPERTY LAW
In Carr-Gottstein Properties v. Benedict,1278 the supreme court
1279
upheld the validity of a liquidated damages clause in a covenant.
The clause imposed a twenty-five dollar per day fine on property
1280
owners who failed to complete construction within one year.
The superior court held that the liquidated damages clause was an
1281
The supreme
impermissible penalty under Kalenka v. Taylor.
court disagreed, holding that this liquidated damages clause was
valid because it met the two-part test adopted by the Restatement
1282
First, construction delays that cause injuries that
of Contracts.
1283
Second, the clause imposed a fine that
are difficult to quantify.
1271.
1272.
1273.
1274.
1275.
1276.
1277.
1278.
1279.
1280.
1281.
1282.
1283.

Id. at 191.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.
72 P.3d 308 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310.
Id. (citing 896 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1995)).
Id. at 311.
Id.
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was a “reasonable forecast of the damages.”1284 Therefore, the su1285
Accordpreme court found that the clause was not a penalty.
ingly, the court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment for Benedict and awarded liquidated damages to Carr1286
Gottstein.
In Holding v. Municipality of Anchorage,1287 the supreme court
held that a lessor prevented from advertising adult-oriented businesses by Alaska Municipal Code section 10.40.050, which bars
such advertising by those who do not own the businesses, is not exempt from the provision if he leases space to parties authorized to
1288
Anchorage issued five citations to
advertise such businesses.
Holding for advertising adult-oriented businesses that operated on
premises owned by Holding but leased to business owners, who
1289
The suhad the proper licenses to operate these businesses.
preme court held that the provision prohibiting non-owners from
1290
First, Holding
advertising applied to Holding for two reasons.
did not have any “grandfather right” to advertise simply because
1291
Second, the provision did not deprive
he owned the premises.
Holding of his constitutionally-protected right of commercial free
speech because the law furthered substantial interests of Anchor1292
age in a manner that was not more restrictive than necessary.
1293
In National Bank of Alaska v. Ketzler, the supreme court
held that a non-titled spouse may invalidate deeds or conveyances
under Alaska Statutes section 34.15.010 as long as the spouse has
an interest in the property separate from the statute and either files
1294
Nancy
suit in court or records his interest in a timely manner.
Ketzler’s husband, Donald, executed a deed on their house to the
National Bank of Alaska in return for a loan, and forged Nancy’s
1295
Donald died approximately six months later,
required signature.
1296
In reand the bank sought to foreclose on the Ketzler’s home.
sponse, Nancy filed suit to have the deed declared void, and the

1284.
1285.
1286.
1287.
1288.
1289.
1290.
1291.
1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 313.
63 P.3d 248 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 249.
71 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 334.
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superior court ruled in her favor.1297 In affirming the superior
court’s holding, the supreme court found that, under section
34.15.010(d), the failure of a titled spouse to join in the conveyance
1298
of the family home automatically invalidates the deed. However,
the failure of a non-titled spouse to join in the conveyance of a
family home does not automatically invalidate the deed; rather, the
deed is valid unless the non-titled spouse, possessing an interest acquired independent of section 34.15.010, either files suit to set the
deed aside or files a notice of interest in the property within one
1299
Therefore, because Nancy had a separate interest in the
year.
family home and filed suit to set aside the deed within one year, the
1300
supreme court affirmed the invalidation of the deed.
1301
In Price v. Eastham, the supreme court reversed a superior
court determination that under a repealed federal statute, Revised
1302
Statute (“RS”) 2477, a right-of-way existed over Price’s land, but
affirmed the finding that a prescriptive easement both existed and
1303
Eassuperceded Price’s mere agricultural interests in the land.
tham and ninety-one other plaintiffs claimed a right to a prescriptive easement over a trail located on Price’s property that had been
used since 1956 for recreational purposes such as hunting and
1304
Upon review of the superior court’s ruling, the sucamping.
preme court made two findings. First, because neither party had
noticed that an RS 2477 right-of-way was at issue, the superior
court’s sua sponte finding that such a right-of-way existed violated
1305
Price’s due process rights. Second, because Price did not own the
land in fee simple absolute and because Alaska Statutes section
38.95.010 precludes a prescriptive easement over government
property, a prescriptive easement was only valid against Price, but
could be terminated in the future if the government chose to ter1306
minate Price’s interests.
In Rausch v. Devine,1307 the supreme court held that a transfer
of a defendant’s property by two quitclaim deeds was valid and re-

1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.

Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 337.
75 P.3d 1051 (Alaska 2003).
Revised Statute § 2477 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932) (repealed 1976).
Price, 75 P.3d at 1059.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057-58.
80 P.3d 733 (Alaska 2003).
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fused to impose trusts in his favor.1308 Rausch, an attorney, delivered two quitclaim deeds to Devine for properties in Anchorage
and Iowa during a ten-year relationship in which they lived to1309
The couple separated in 2000, and
gether and had one child.
Devine filed suit, requesting that Rausch vacate the house in Anchorage and that the other property in Iowa and Anchorage be dis1310
The trial court ruled in Devine’s favor, and Rausch aptributed.
1311
Rausch first challenged the validity of the deeds,
pealed.
claiming that there had been no delivery because he did not truly
1312
The supreme court held that
intend to transfer title to Devine.
“a recorded deed gives rise to a presumption of valid delivery that
may be rebutted by the party challenging delivery by clear and
1313
Here, the court upheld the trial court’s
convincing evidence.”
finding that Rausch did not provide clear and convincing evidence
1314
to surmount the presumption of validity. The supreme court also
rejected Rausch’s argument that a resulting trust in his favor
should be found because he did not intend to transfer the prop1315
Instead, the court upheld the trial court’s finding that the
erty.
transfer had been a gift and that a trust had thus not been
1316
Finally, the supreme court refused to impose a conformed.
1317
The court
structive trust on the properties in Rausch’s favor.
held that constructive trusts are appropriate only to prevent unjust
enrichment and affirmed the trial court’s findings that Devine was
1318
not unjustly enriched by the transfer.
In Reynolds v. Sisco Group, Inc.,1319 the supreme court held
that a creditor may enforce an execution or levy against a deceased
party’s estate if the execution or levy was formally made before the
1320
Reynolds obtained a judgment in another suit
party’s death.
against Sisco Group (“Sisson”) and began to collect the judgment
1321
Sisson transferred
by attempting to seize vans owned by Sisson.

1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.
1314.
1315.
1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.

Id. at 735.
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 744.
Id.
70 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 397.
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two of the vans to a friend who then sold them.1322 Reynolds then
attempted to seize the payments made by the person who bought
1323
During this process Sisson died, and his estate atthe vans.
tempted to regain possession of the vans and the payments under
1324
The superior court granted
Alaska Statutes section 13.16.505.
the estate’s request, and Reynolds appealed. The supreme court
held that section 13.16.505 did not apply to the van that Reynolds
had seized, and that Reynolds was therefore entitled to the van,
1325
The supreme
because the van was seized before Sisson died.
court also held that there was still an issue as to whether the writ of
attachment to seize the payments was delivered to the party that
1326
bought the two vans before Sisson died. If Sisson died before the
1327
writ was served, then the estate was entitled to the payments.
The supreme court remanded to the superior court to make a
1328
finding of fact.
In Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,1329 the supreme court held that a municipality is within its authority to impose conditions on a developer prior to the issuance of construc1330
Spinell was in the business of
tion and occupation permits.
constructing homes on acquired property, and then selling the
1331
The Municipality of Anchorage required
homes to third parties.
Spinell to obtain a building permit prior to constructing the homes,
and a certificate of occupancy prior to transferring the properties
1332
The Municipality conditioned Spinell’s receipt
to third parties.
of the permits on a variety of tasks, including public improvements,
landscaping easements, and approval of a homeowner’s associa1333
The Municipality also maintained that improvements retion.
quired of the subdivider that sold the properties to Spinell ran with
the land, and thus required Spinell to complete the improve1334
Spinell received all building permits, but afterward filed
ments.
suit, alleging that the Municipality’s conditional permits violated

1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.
1327.
1328.
1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 391
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
78 P.3d 692 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id.
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Spinell’s substantive due process and equal protection rights, and
effected a taking for which Spinell should be accorded compensa1335
In affirming the superior court’s holding, the supreme
tion.
court held that the Municipality, in imposing conditions on the issuance of permits, was acting fully within its powers under the An1336
The court also held that the municipal
chorage Municipal Code.
code empowered the city to enforce the conditions placed on the
1337
After determining that the Muprevious owner against Spinell.
nicipality was permitted to issue such permits, the court concluded
1338
Because the
that Spinell’s constitutional claims had no merit.
Municipality was under no mandatory duty to issue an unconditioned permit, Spinell did not have a property interest that was
1339
The court also held
protected under substantive due process.
that the conditions imposed by the permits did not effect a taking,
because (1) the municipality did not invade Spinell’s property, (2)
there was no showing that the Municipality’s actions adversely affected the value of Spinell’s property, and (3) Spinell did not show
that the exactions were not proportional to the properties’ poten1340
tially adverse impact.
In Stanek v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1341 the supreme court
upheld a borough taxation ordinance excluding a portion of resi1342
Stadential property used as the owner’s permanent residence.
nek, an Anchorage resident, challenged this ordinance on constitutional and statutory grounds as discriminatory against nonresidents
1343
of the borough. Under an equal protection analysis, the supreme
court determined that the legitimate reason basis is used to deter1344
Here, the distinction
mine if the distinction drawn is justifiable.
between owner-occupied homes and second homes was legitimate
1345
to promote home ownership.
1346
In Tush v. Pharr, the supreme court held that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment against the defendants because genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to each of

1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.
1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.

Id.
Id. at 696
Id. at 697.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 702-03.
81 P.3d 268 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
68 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2003).
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the various legal malpractice claims asserted.1347 As landlord for
several properties, Tush brought a claim for eviction against a ten1348
In the action, the tenant prevailed and was awarded a
ant.
judgment of over $1.6 million for counterclaims of multiple inten1349
After Tush’s insurance company refused to pay for
tional torts.
the claim because it was not tendered on a timely basis, Tush sued
her attorneys on several theories of malpractice: professional negli1350
On apgence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.
peal of summary judgment, the supreme court found that several
issues of fact remained such that summary judgment was precluded. First, the court stated that the “ambiguous nature” of
Tush’s responses to questions of insurance coverage may be cause
for malpractice if her attorney had a duty under the circumstances
1351
Second, the court agreed with Tush that
to investigate further.
questions of fact remained as to whether insurance coverage would
still have been denied as a result of (1) her own actions in misrepresenting insurance application information, or (2) under the “in1352
Finally,
tentional acts exclusion” clause of her insurance policy.
the court found that disputed issues existed as to whether Tush’s
insurance would have covered her claims regardless of her un1353
timely submission.
In Vukmir v. Vukmir,1354 the supreme court held that a will
provision providing a purchase option on the testator’s home
clearly provided that the heirs were not responsible for the mort1355
Louis Vukmir’s will progage debt if the option was exercised.
vided his daughter, Linda, with an option to purchase his home by
paying $80,000 to his estate, which would in turn be divided among
1356
Linda timely exercised her option, subsehis four children.
quently using the $80,000 payment to pay the home’s outstanding
mortgage and then depositing the remainder into the estate’s ac1357
However, the lower court
count for division among the heirs.
found that, under the language of the will, Linda alone should be
responsible for the mortgage, and the full $80,000 should be di-

1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.
1356.
1357.

Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247-49.
Id. at 1251.
74 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 922.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 919.
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vided among the children.1358 The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s finding that the words of the will itself clearly expressed Louis Vukmir’s intent to give Linda an option to purchase
1359
his home in exchange for a gift of $80,000 to his four children.
1360
Therefore, Linda was responsible for the mortgage.
XI. TORT LAW
In Dayton v. State, the court of appeals upheld a superior
court decision to deny reconsideration of a restitution claim, but
1362
directed the superior court to reduce the amount of the award.
Dayton pled guilty to third-degree assault for breaking and entering the home of West and subsequently injuring her and destroying
1363
Dayton argued that the superior court erred in
her property.
awarding restitution for the full original price of the hardware and
1364
software, ordering restitution for software installed on the com1365
1366
The
puter, and denying Dayton’s motion for reconsideration.
court of appeals held that the restitution price should have been
discounted because of the age of the system and therefore directed
1367
It further held that the
the superior court to reduce the award.
superior court properly awarded restitution on the software be1368
Finally, the court of
cause it was necessary to make West whole.
appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of Dayton’s motion for
reconsideration because Dayton had ample opportunity to produce
1369
evidence during West’s cross-examination.
In Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hospital,1370 the supreme court
held that hospitals do not have a non-delegable duty to provide
1371
In
non-negligent surgeons outside the emergency room context.
1997, Fletcher underwent unsuccessful medical treatment for abdominal pains from Dr. Rene Alvarez at South Peninsula Hospital
1361

1358.
1359.
1360.
1361.
1362.
1363.
1364.
1365.
1366.
1367.
1368.
1369.
1370.
1371.

Id.
Id. at 922.
Id.
78 P.3d 270 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 271.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 274.
71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 837.
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before being treated properly by another surgeon.1372 Fletcher sued
the hospital, claiming that it had a non-delegable duty to provide
1373
The supreme court held that the
non-negligent physician care.
hospital only had a non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent
physician care in situations in which a patient seeks services at the
hospital as an institution and is treated by a physician that the pa1374
As Fletcher specifically sought out Alvarez
tient did not select.
and was looking to him, as opposed to the hospital itself, for help,
1375
the non-delegable duty did not apply.
1376
In Getchell v. Lodge, the supreme court held that a driver
who is negligent per se as a result of committing a traffic violation
can be excused for such negligence if the driver’s conduct is precipitated by an emergency that is independent of the driver’s con1377
Getchell was injured when Lodge, in an attempt to avoid a
duct.
moose on an icy highway, hit her brakes and veered into oncoming
1378
Getchell brought a personal injury action against Lodge,
traffic.
1379
Getchell appealed
who was found not negligent by the jury.
following a denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
1380
verdict. Getchell argued on appeal that Lodge’s violation of traffic regulations, as a result of her crossing the center lane of traffic,
constituted negligence per se, thereby shifting the burden of proof
to Lodge to show that her conduct was excused, and that reasonable jurors could not have concluded from the evidence that Lodge
1381
In Ferrel v. Baxter,1382 the supreme court
met her burden.
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ position on excused
violation of traffic regulations, which allows an excuse for violation
of traffic regulations when the actor is confronted by an emergency
1383
Therefore, the court held that
that is not due to his misconduct.
reasonable jurors could have found that Lodge met the burden of
proof for excuse, given that Lodge was confronted with an emer1384
gency situation.

1372.
1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.
1377.
1378.
1379.
1380.
1381.
1382.
1383.
1384.

Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 839.
Id.
65 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §288(A) (1965).
Getchell, 65 P.3d at 55.
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In Kiokun v. State,1385 the supreme court held that the decision
whether to initiate a search and rescue is protected by discretionary
1386
Kiokun sued the State after three members
function immunity.
of her family died from freezing temperatures after their car was
1387
Before the bodies were found, Alaska State
stuck in deep snow.
Troopers were notified of the abandoned vehicle beside which the
1388
The
word “HELP” and an arrow were stamped in the snow.
Alaska State Troopers decided not to initiate a search and rescue
1389
To determine whether the
operation until temperatures rose.
state’s actions were immune from a tort claim, the supreme court
distinguished between planning activities and operational activities,
1390
The court found that here, because
which are not immune.
planning to delay the search and rescue operation until temperatures rose was sufficiently based on resource allocation and public
policy considerations, it was better left to the immediate discretion
1391
Similarly, the supreme court
and expertise of the state officials.
found that Alaska Statutes section 18.60.120 did not create a mandatory duty to initiate a search and rescue operation regardless of
1392
Therefore, finding that the Alaska State
the circumstances.
Troopers’ decision not to immediately initiate a search was protected by discretionary function immunity, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s judgment, vacated the jury verdict, and
1393
remanded for entry of judgment for the state.
1394
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe, the supreme court, applying pre-1997 law, held that damages did not have to be appor1395
Roe sued
tioned between intentional and negligent tortfeasors.
the Borough after two of its employees with criminal backgrounds
had intercourse with and impregnated Roe’s developmentally
1396
The suchallenged daughter while under the Borough’s care.
preme court held that the Borough was not entitled to have dam1397
Since
ages stemming from these intentional torts apportioned.

1385.
1386.
1387.
1388.
1389.
1390.
1391.
1392.
1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.
1397.

74 P.3d 209 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213, 218.
Id. at 219.
Id.
63 P.3d 1009 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1015.
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the torts occurred in 1991, the supreme court relied upon the ap1398
These
portionment statutes that were applicable at that time.
statutes were silent on the apportionment of damages arising from
1399
intentional conduct; therefore, the supreme court applied the
common law of the time, which stated that “a person who is liable
to another based on a failure to protect the other from the specific
risk of an intentional tort is jointly and severally liable for the share
of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfea1400
The supreme court then concluded that the Borough
sor. . . .”
was in fact negligent in failing to protect Roe’s daughter from its
employees’ intentional torts and therefore could be held wholly li1401
The supreme court also found that the
able for the damages.
trial court did not err in allowing the jury to award damages for the
1402
extraordinary costs associated with raising Roe’s granddaughter.
1403
In Marine Solution Services v. Horton, the supreme court
1404
held that The Pennsylvania rule, which shifts the burden of proof
to a marine vessel to show a lack of causation where the vessel is in
violation of a statutory duty, applies in non-collision cases if there
1405
is a nexus between the statutory violation and the injury caused.
Horton, president of Marine Solution Services (“MSS”), was in1406
Horton filed suit
jured while helping move one of MSS’s barges.
against MSS and the MSS employee operating the tugboat, alleging
five causes of action, including Jones Act claims based on Horton’s
1407
At trial, Horton was found fifteen percent at
status as a seaman.
1408
The supreme court
fault, and awarded compensatory damages.
held that Horton, despite his ownership of forty-nine percent of
MSS’s stock, was not an alter ego of the corporate entity, and that
1409
MSS also alleged that
he could therefore bring suit against MSS.
Horton was not a seaman, and that therefore he should not have
1410
The supreme
been able to bring claims under the Jones Act.

1398. Id. at 1011-12.
1399. See Former ALASKA STATUTES §§ 09.17.080, 09.17.080 (Michie 1991).
1400. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14
(2000).
1401. Kodiak, 63 P.3d at 1015.
1402. Id. at 1018.
1403. 70 P.3d 393 (Alaska 2003).
1404. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
1405. Horton, 70 P.3d at 407.
1406. Id. at 399.
1407. Id. at 400-01.
1408. Id. 401.
1409. Id. at 402.
1410. Id.
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court disagreed, holding that a bright line rule requiring that an individual spend thirty percent of his time at sea to be considered a
seaman was not appropriate, and that the question of seaman
1411
MSS also alleged that The
status was properly left to the jury.
1412
The rule provides
Pennsylvania rule was improperly applied.
that where a vessel is in violation of a statutory duty intended to
prevent collisions, the burden of proof shifts to the vessel to show
1413
The suthat the violation was not the cause of the accident.
preme court disagreed with MSS’s contention that the rule should
only be applied in collision cases, and held that the rule applies if
there is a nexus between the statutory violation and the injury suf1414
fered.
In State v. Sandsness,1415 the supreme court held that DFYS has
no duty to use due care in deciding whether to petition a court for
1416
Darrel Whitaker
extension of a juvenile offender’s commitment.
shot and killed Sandsness shortly after being released from a juve1417
The plaintiffs, Sandsness’ widow and
nile detention center.
daughter, subsequently sued DFYS for negligently failing to properly evaluate Whitaker before his release and to supervise him
1418
adequately after his release. The supreme court held that section
319 of the Restatement (second) of Torts did not impose a tort
duty on DFYS to seek a court-ordered extension of Whitaker’s de1419
The court’s reasoning was based on the rationale
tention period.
that successful rehabilitation of juveniles requires the earliest pos1420
sible reintegration of the juvenile with his family and community.
Furthermore, the court pointed to Alaska Statutes section
47.12.260, which permits DFYS to release juveniles when there is a
1421
reasonable probability that the minor will not violate the law.
Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
1422
entry of summary judgment for the state.

1411.
1412.
1413.
1414.
1415.
1416.
1417.
1418.
1419.
1420.
1421.
1422.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 405 n.33.
Id. at 407.
72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).
See id. at 308.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 308.
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In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. White-Rodgers Corp.,1423
the supreme court held that the state’s six-year statute of limitations for trespass actions governed the claims of an insurer seeking
indemnification from third parties whose actions allegedly caused
1424
After a natural gas explosion
property damage to two insureds.
destroyed the home of William and Sally Brook, State Farm, their
1425
Nearly six years later, State
insurer, paid the property damages.
Farm filed a complaint seeking to recover such payments, alleging
that the explosion was caused by a natural gas leak that State Farm
traced to products manufactured, sold, or supplied by defendants
White-Rodgers Corporation, State Industries, Inc., and Semco En1426
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
ergy.
State Farm’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limita1427
The federal district court certified
tions governing tort claims.
the question to the supreme court whether State Farm’s claims
would be governed by the two-year tort statute of limitations or the
1428
Relying on Fernandes v.
six-year trespass statute of limitations.
1429
Portwine, the court examined the injuries claimed, rather than
the cause of action pled, finding that State Farm’s claim for property damages alleged a substantial interference with the Brooks’
right to possess and use their property and that such alleged inter1430
The court concluded that the six-year
ference was unlawful.
1431
“trespass” statute of limitations governed State Farm’s claims.
1432
In Zaverl v. Hanley, the supreme court held that the defendant could not testify at trial on topics he refused to discuss at his
1433
deposition. Zeverl’s estate sued inter alia, Defendant Borden for
negligently diagnosing and failing to treat Zeverl, ultimately caus1434
As instructed by his attorney, Borden refused to
ing her death.
answer questions at his deposition regarding his opinion as to a
1435
Borden’s attorney stated that Borspecific medical treatment.
den was not an expert and would not be offered as an expert re-

1423.
1424.
1425.
1426.
1427.
1428.
1429.
1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.

77 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
56 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 2002).
State Farm, 77 P.3d at 731.
Id. at 731-32.
64 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id. at 812-13.
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garding the specific medical treatment.1436 At trial, however, the
1437
The jury found
court allowed Borden to testify as to his opinion.
for the defendants. The supreme court held that Borden could not
testify at trial regarding topics he refused to discuss at his deposition because the inconsistent positions, without fair notice of the
1438
The suchanged testimony, thwarted the purposes of discovery.
preme court remanded to the trial court for determination of
1439
whether Borden’s testimony in question was harmless or not.
Keith A. Rogers1440

1436. Id.
1437. Id. at 814.
1438. Id. at 815.
1439. Id. at 816.
1440. The editor extends his thanks to Alyssa Rower, Marika Athens, John
Fred, and the authors of the 2003 Year in Review: Wyatt Bloomfield, Matthew
Borah, Melissa Ganz, Stacy Hauf, Ryan King, Vikram Patel, Lindsay Pennington,
Kimberly Perdue, Trey Rayburn, Jim Stevens, Hayley Weimer, and Abizer Zanzi.

